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The Framers of the Constitution of
the United States?t
Harry V Jaffa *
I. INTRODUCTION
The following letter to the Editor of Policy Review was
published in the spring 1986 issue of that journal:'
Attorney General Meese, writing in the winter 1986 Pol-
icy Review,2 defends a constitutional jurisprudence of "origi-
nal intent." It is one that, he says, seeks fidelity to the
Constitution, and not one that seeks political results from
the decisions of the Supreme Court. The judges, he says,
should uphold the law and not seek to enact their own per-
sonal or political preferences.
3
As the leading exhibit of the evils that result from a
departure from these principles, Mr. Meese offers us the
following:
In the 1850's, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney read blacks out of the constitution in
order to invalidate Congress' attempt to limit the
spread of slavery. The Dred Scott decision, famously
described as a judicial "self-infliction wound," helped
bring on the Civil War. There is a lesson in such his-
tory. There is danger in seeing the Constitution as an
empty vessel into which each generation may pour its
passion and prejudice.4
Unfortunately for Mr. Meese's argument, no one, on or
off the Court, has ever expounded the theory of original
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intent with greater eloquence or conviction than Chief Jus-
tice Taney in the case of Dred Scott.5  In considering
whether negroes might have standing to sue in United States
courts, or whether slave property might be afforded less pro-
tection than any other kind of property, the Chief Justice
wrote:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in pub-
lic opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate
race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this coun-
try, should induce the court to give to the words of the
Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor
than they were intended to bear when the instrument
was framed and adopted. Such an argument would be
altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to
interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed
unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument
itself by which it may be amended; but while it
remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was
understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only
the same in words, but the same in meaning, and dele-
gates the same powers to the Government, and
reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to
the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its
present form, it speaks not only in the same words,
but with the same meaning and intent with which it
spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and
was voted on and adopted by the people of the United
States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate
the judicial character of this court, and make it the
mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the
day. This court was not created by the Constitution
for such purposes.
6
Never has the judicial doctrine of original intent been stated
with greater perspicuity. Never has a judge, in giving judg-
ment, been more clearly committed in his own mind to repu-
diating the "passion and prejudice" of his own "generation"
than Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott.
Taney decided that Dred Scott, as a member of an infer-
ior and degraded race (inferior and degraded, that is, by the
law of the Constitution), was not and could not become a cit-
izen of the United States.7 But Taney also decided that
5. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
6. Id. at 426.
7. Id. at 404-05.
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under the Constitution, there was no ground upon which
Congress could discriminate between slave property and
other forms of property. Here is the Chief Justice, speaking
again.
It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a dif-
ference between property in a slave and other prop-
erty .... And if the Constitution recognizes the right
of property of the master in a slave, and makes no dis-
tinction between that description of property and
other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting
under the authority of the United States . . . has a
right to draw such a distinction .... [T]he right of
property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed
in the Constitution.... The right to traffic in it, like
an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was
guaranted [sic] ... in every State that might desire it,
for twenty years .... And no word can be found in
the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power
over slave property, or which entitles property of that
kind to less protection than property of any other
description.s
The Chief Justice was then very far, in his own mind, from
attempting to "read blacks out of the Constitution in order
to invalidate Congress' attempt to limit the spread of slav-
ery."9 It was the attempt of others to read blacks into the
Constitution to which Taney objected. Opinion, he said,
(quite erroneously) had become more "liberal" in the inter-
vening years since the adoption of the Constitution. But he
denied that such "liberal" opinion ought to govern him as a
judge, so long as the words of the constitution remained
unamended. (What sentiment could be more gratifying to
Mr. Meese than that!) And looking at the words of the Con-
stitution what he saw was that the slave was regarded as "an
ordinary article of merchandise."' Because of this, the only
constitutional power of Congress over slavery in the Territo-
8. Id at 451-52.
9. There was no such attempt by Congress in the 1850's as Mr. Meese supposes.
Congress repealed the Missouri Compromise restriction of slavery in 1854 and no bill
to restore it passed either House before the Civil War. Taney's opinion in Dred Scott
did not invalidate any attempted action of the Congress, but rather attempted to
invalidate the principal political goal of the Republican Party, whose platform in 1856
had called for the restoration of the Missouri Compromise. It was, whether
intentionally or not, an intervention in the political, not the legislative, process. Mr.
Meese, like Justice Rehnquist, has rewritten American history in the interests of his
polemic against judicial activism.
10. 60 U.S. at 451.
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ries was "the power, coupled with the duty, of guarding and
protecting the owner in his rights."'1
Whatever is wrong with this opinion, it is not because
the Chief Justice did not hold to the doctrine of original
intent. It is not because he thought for a moment that the
Constitution was an empty vessel "into which [his own gen-
eration [might] pour its passion and prejudice." What he
said was exactly the opposite. The Attorney General has a
long way to go to make the doctrine of original intent intel-
lectually defensible.
Since the publication of the foregoing letter there has been
no response from the Attorney General, or from any one of his
staff, explaining how the doctrine of original intent might be
defended as the basis for interpreting the Constitution. I am
well aware of how little time these busy men have to answer
mere pedants. My intention in writing the letter, however,
was not to rebuff these adherents of the doctrine of original
intent. It was, rather, to demonstrate that subscribing to the
doctrine of original intent does not tell us what the original
intent was. The Civil War was fought by two sides, both of
whom believed (as did Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott) that
they were defending the Constitution of the United States, and
that they understood the Constitution as it had been originally
intended to be understood.
The deepest political differences in American history have
always been differences concerning the meaning of the Consti-
tution, whether as originally intended, or as amended. Since
the Civil War, the debate has often taken the form of a dispute
over whether or not the Civil War amendments, notably the
fourteenth, have changed the way in which the whole Consti-
tution, and not only the amended parts, is read or interpreted.
Does not the abolition of slavery and the extension of United
States' citizenship to "all persons" born and residing in the
United States--of whatever race or color--change the substan-
tive understanding of all the rights that the Constitution func-
tionally or purposefully secures? How could this be otherwise,
if in the original Constitution some of those referred to as
"persons" were elsewhere considered to be chattels, and some
of these same persons were also counted as three-fifths of a
person? If legally a person can be three-fifths of a person,
does this not mean that "personality" and all constitutional
11. Id. at 452.
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rights to life, liberty, and property have their origin solely in
positive law? For surely in nature there cannot be three-fifths
of a person, any more than there could be half a child to settle
the claims of each of the two women who came before King
Solomon.1
2
Mr. Meese has attacked the "incorporation" doctrine
recently, a doctrine that applies certain of the first ten amend-
ments to the states, no less than to the United States. Whether
right or wrong, he took his position on the basis of the alleged
intention of the original Constitution without addressing the
question of how, or even whether, that Constitution is trans-
formed by the Civil War amendments. It is, however, either
naive or disingenuous to think that one can appeal to the "orig-
inal intentions" of those who framed and those who ratified
the Constitution without facing forthrightly the question of
what those intentions actually were. It is not possible to even
discuss how or whether the Civil War amendments trans-
formed the original Constitution without saying first of all
what the original Constitution was.
In fact, the Attorney General appears to be wholly una-
ware of the fact that the greater part of those who aggressively
invoke the doctrine of "original intent" today are self-styled
conservatives whose chief intellectual progenitor appears to
be-from all the available evidence-not the Father of the
Constitution, James Madison or any of his coadjutors, but John
C. Calhoun. That is to say, these conservatives largely follow
the man who, more prominently than any other, rejected the
proposition that all men are created equal, and who affirmed
on the contrary that slavery was a "positive good." I believe,
however, that it is undeniably true that it was the paramount
intention of the Framers of the Constitution, and of the people
for whom they framed it, "to institute new government" in the
sense in which the Declaration of Independence speaks of
instituting new government. Indeed, Madison is explicit in the
43rd Federalist 3 that the Convention was justified by the right
of revolution in transcending its instructions from the Con-
gress of the Confederation. It was to be the purpose of the
"more perfect Union" to better "secure these rights."'1 4 These
rights were the unalienable rights with which all men had
12. 1 Kings 3:16.
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
14. Id.
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been equally "endowed by their Creator"'15 under "the laws of
nature and of nature's God."' 6 We are thus confronted with
the paradox that those who today most aggressively appeal to
the doctrine of original intent are among its most resolute
antagonists. As I shall prove in appendix C, this is true of the
new Chief Justice of the United States, Justice Rehnquist, as it
is of his anatagonist Justice Brennan.
In the present controversy, we find that Justice Brennan's
Constitution is one of "overarching principles" whose applica-
tion seems to be virtually uncontrolled by the specific provi-
sions of the text, or by anything that those who drafted and
those who ratified such provisions might have meant by them.
For example, Justice Brennan brushes aside the references to
capital crime in the fifth amendment and holds nonetheless
that capital punishment is unconstitutional by reason of the
provision against "cruel and unusual punishments" in the
eighth amendment. 7 He does so notwithstanding the fact that
the fifth and eighth amendments were passed and ratified at
the same time. Justice Brennan's "overarching principles"
enable him to reject the provisions of the Constitution that he
does not like and to give the ones he does like whatever mean-
ing he chooses them to have. Clearly, this is the negation of
constitutionalism. Perhaps he thinks that because the same
Constitution that sanctioned capital punishment also sanc-
tioned slavery, the abolition of slavery implied the abolition of
the equally barbarous (as he might say) practice of capital pun-
ishment. This argument would be more persuasive were it not
that the fourteenth amendment repeats the language of the
fifth declaring that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"' 8 and signify-
ing that persons may under certain circumstances be deprived
lawfully of their lives, as well as of their liberty and property.
Justice Brennan's "overarching principles" appear, therefore,
to be part of an evolutionary process, a process in which a pro-
gressively exalted meaning is discovered in the various provi-
sions of the Constitution (most particularly the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment). This meaning is revealed by the historical afflatus to
15. Id.
16. Id. at 275-76.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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his progressive judicial conscience. Consider these remarks
about Justice Brennan's supreme constitutional principle,
"human dignity."
We are still striving toward that goal, and doubtless it will
be an eternal quest. For if the interaction of this Justice
[viz., himself] and the constitutional text over the years con-
firms any single proposition, it is that the demands of human
dignity will never cease to evolve.' 9
It is then an evolutionary process that enables Justice Brennan
to discover the true meaning of the Constitution even when
flatly contradicting the text itself. And this same process
enables him to contradict, not only the actual Constitution, but
whatever it is that anyone else may think the Constitution
ought to mean. For Justice Brennan is explicit that he alone
may truly represent the community, even when no one else in
the community shares his opinion: "On this issue [but why not
any other?], the death penalty, I hope to embody a community
striving for human dignity, although perhaps not yet
arrived."'20
Thus, Justice Brennan finds the true meaning of the Con-
stitution, not in the text and not in any interpretation of the
text by others, including the entire political community acting
through the political process, but in some kind of "striving,"
albeit "not yet arrived." This "striving" may have the charac-
ter of a revelation vouchsafed to the Justice, but not to anyone
else. Yet such "striving" appears to him to be sufficient ground
for the authentic meaning of human dignity and therefore of
the Constitution. Such visitations by the evolutionary
zeitgeist2' parallel those of the proletarian consciousness that,
as Lenin discovered, were not vouchsafed to the proletariat
itself, but to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party
and more particularly to its Chairman, namely, himself.22
One can, therefore, fully sympathize with Attorney Gen-
eral Meese's (and indeed Justice Rehnquist's) repudiation of
this idea of "a living Constitution." And one can sympathize as
well with the desire to see constitutional jurisprudence
19. W. Brennan, To the Text and Teaching Symposium, Speech at Georgetown
University (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 23 (1986).
20. Id at 24.
21. Zeitgeist is a german term referring to the spirit of the age, the feeling or
thought of a particular period. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1652 (2d ed. 1976).
22. N. LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE? (1902).
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anchored in what the Constitution actually says, and not what
the Justices might wish it to say. But if it can be said that Jus-
tice Brennan's Constitution is one of "overarching principles"
uncontrolled by the actual text, so it might be ventured that
Mr. Meese's Constitution is a text without overarching
principles.
In a speech delivered at Dickinson College, September 17,
1985, the Attorney General asserted that the principles of the
Declaration of Independence were the principles of the Consti-
tution.23 That is indeed the truth of the matter, according to
the greatest of all interpreters of the American Constitution,
Abraham Lincoln. But Mr. Meese's Constitution Day speech,
with its commitment to the idea of natural law as the ground
of the Constitution's positive law, seems to have no precedent
and no consequence either within the Justice Department, or
among the cognoscenti of his judicial nominees. I do not know
of a single judicial nominee-and least of all the new Chief
Justice-who gives the least credence to the proposition that
there are "laws of nature and of nature's God." Nor are there
any, so far as I can tell, who recognize, with James Madison,
that it is in the character or nature of the social compact or
contract, made in pursuance of these laws, that the authority
of the people may itself be discovered. As far as its theoretical
recognition or its practical consequences are concerned, Mr.
Meese's Constitution Day speech, however praiseworthy, is a
quixotic irrelevance. I have, however, given it a sympathetic
critique in appendix A.
Mr. Meese, and the new Chief Justice, have waged a war
against judicial activism and against legislation disguised as
adjudication. With this, one can certainly agree. But their
argument comes, again and again, to rest upon the proposition
(with which I am also in full agreement) that legislation is
properly the function of the people, or the elected representa-
tives of the people. Courts exist to enforce the laws-and to
interpret them only as this becomes necessary as an incidence
of their enforcement. But interpretation must not be a dis-
guise by which judges invent the law-as Justice Brennan
clearly does when he repudiates the actual words of the Con-
stitution. In interpreting the laws, the judges are to ask them-
selves, what is the law? Not, what ought the law to be? For it
is the will of the people, not the will of the judges, that the
23. E. Meese, Speech at Dickinson College (Sept. 17, 1985).
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courts are entrusted to carry out. The will of the people is the
ground of all constitutional authority. What, however, is the
ground of the authority of the will of the people? This ques-
tion too must be answered.
For the Justice Department and the epigones of "original
intent," the supremacy of "the people" is a factum brutum, an
axiomatic premise from which everything follows, but which
cannot-and therefore need not-have any justification. This,
however, was not the understanding of the Founding Fathers,
nor can it be reconciled with their "original intentions." James
Madison, the Father of the Constitution, declared over and
over again that "compact is the basis of all free government."24
By this he meant that the will of a people is not the will of any
chance aggregate of discrete individuals, but rather that of a
body incorporated under "the laws of nature and of nature's
God." It is a civil society deliberately and rationally formed for
the purposes of civil government, which purposes are not
themselves the invention of the people, but are rather given to
them with their nature and flow from that nature as rationally
apprehended. The people as understood by the Founding
Fathers were characterized not merely by will, but by a
rational will. Said the author of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence in his inaugural address: "All, too, will bear in mind this
sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all
cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable;
that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law
must protect, and to violate would be oppression."25
We are reminded as well that in the first number of the
Federalist Alexander Hamilton defined the enterprise embod-
ied in the Constitution as an attempt "to decide the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of
establishing good government from reflection and choice [viz.,
by reason], or whether they are forever destined to depend for
their political constitutions on accident and force."2
It cannot be too greatly emphasized that the people's will,
properly so called, is a rational will, whose inherent right to be
obeyed is attenuated to the extent that it becomes merely arbi-
24. 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 392 (R. Worthington ed.
1884) [hereinafter WRITING OF JAMES MADISON].
25. T. Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), reprinted in H.
COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 186, 187 (7th ed. 1963) [hereinafter
COMMAGER].
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 3 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1982).
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trary or despotic. "An elected despotism was not the govern-
ment we fought for,"'27 wrote Jefferson in the Notes on
Virginia. Certainly the courts should not usurp the powers of
legislation. But neither should majorities usurp the rights of
minorities, nor should legislatures exercise powers that the
people have not by the Constitution delegated to them. For
the doctrine of the Framers of the Constitution was a doctrine
of limited government. And the idea of limited government
must be understood, not only in relationship to what the peo-
ple collectively have reserved to themselves, and have not del-
egated to their government. It must be understood as well in
relationship to what the individuals in forming a people, have
reserved to themselves. What individuals have thus reserved,
even the people collectively have no rightful power to delegate
to government. Such reservations imply, therefore, that even
the collective sovereignty of the people-such as that which
ordained and established the Constitution-is limited. The
sovereignty of the people does not authorize the establishment
of any government whatever with any powers whatever. The
people have no rightful power to do whatever "is not naturally
impossible" (as the textbook account of the legal sovereignty of
the "Queen in Parliament" asserts). The question of judicial
usurpation in a free government is part of a much larger prob-
lem, a problem wholly invisible to the legal positivists of con-
temporary conservatism who see only the will, but not the
reason of the people informing their sovereign authority.
The elements of rationality implicit in the choice of a free
government obligate one not to impose despotism upon others,
except insofar as it may become necessary as an incidence of
the natural right to self-defense. These same elements of
rationality inform the ordering of a free, as distinct from a des-
potic, government. Separation of powers, for example, was gen-
erally understood to be an indispensable feature of free
government. The idea of the rule of law-flowing from the
proposition of natural human equality-is embodied in the
reciprocal requirement that those who live under the law
should share in making the law they live under and that those
who make the law should live under the law that they make.
The Attorney General, apart from his one spasmodic effort
in the Dickinson College speech of 1985, seems to regard the
question of the Constitution's principles as something that one
27. F. DONOVAN, THE THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS 101 (1963).
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discovers merely by looking at the Constitution. The Constitu-
tion, however, as nearly everyone agrees, is a bundle of com-
promises. There is nothing in the Constitution itself by which
one can discover the "prudence" of the Constitution, that is to
say, by which one can distinguish the compromises of the Con-
stitution from the principles of the Constitution. Eleven states
attempted in 1861 to "secede" from the Union and establish an
independent government, the Confederate States of America.
They did so because Abraham Lincoln was elected President of
the United States on a platform that called for an end to the
extension of slavery into United States Territories. This inten-
tion to end the extension of slavery--or, as Lincoln himself put
it, to place slavery "in the course of ultimate extinction,"2
they declared to be a fundamental breach of the faith upon
which the constitutional compact rested. It constituted such an
invidious discrimination between the property and social insti-
tutions of the states as to make the continuation of the political
union between them a moral and political impossibility. Noth-
ing in the text of the Constitution, they declared, warranted
such a distinction between the forms of property recognized to
be such by the laws of the different states of the Union. For
this they had what they claimed to be the highest of all consti-
tutional authorities-the Supreme Court of the United States
speaking through its Chief Justice in Dred Scott.29 The Consti-
tution, they insisted, had recognized the institution of chattel
slavery in various ways, above all in the requirement that the
government of the United States return fugitive slaves to their
masters.
For a President, and a party, to hold in moral abhorrence
an institution sanctioned by the laws of fifteen states and by
the Constitution made political friendship among the states
impossible. It was common ground to Lincoln and his antago-
nists that common citizenship implied and required agreement
on the morality of such a fundamental institution as slavery.
Note that the first platform of the Republican Party, in 1856,
condemned both "polygamy and slavery" as "twin relics of bar-
barism.""° In his House Divided speech,3' Lincoln declared
28. R. BASLER, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 447 (1946)
[hereinafter BASLER].
29. 60 U.S. at 393.
30. 2 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1040 (A. Schlesinger & F.
Israel eds. 1971).
31. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 345; BASLER, supra note 28, at 372.
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that a point had been reached in which a decision in principle
had to be made between slavery and freedom.
In Dred Scott, the Court declared that there was no lawful
way to exclude slavery from any United States Territory. 2
Once public opinion accepted this as a premise, there would,
Lincoln said, be another decision for which Dred Scott was
merely the prologue, declaring that there was no lawful way to
exclude slavery from any state of the Union. At that point,
said Lincoln, slavery would become lawful in all the states, old
as well as new, North, as well as South. This, according to Lin-
coln, was the crisis of the house divided: Either slavery was
wrong and ought to be restricted, or it was right and ought to
be extended. The question about Dred Scott was not, as the
Attorney General and Chief Justice Rehnquist suppose,
whether or not the Court had usurped powers belonging to
Congress, the question was whether Negroes (free or slaves)
had any natural rights which the Constitution was bound to
recognize.
Mr. Meese (with the exception of his Dickinson College
Speech) and his judicial nominees come to the question of orig-
inal intention, through the medium of a conservative move-
ment which, at its heart, is in agreement with the argument of
the South when it attempted to break up the Union in 1861.
They come to the question of original intent having rejected
the ground of the Constitution in natural justice and having
rejected the distinction between despotism and freedom as that
distinction was asserted in the Declaration of Independence.
In 1825 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson considered
what books and documents the Board of Visitors ought to rec-
ommend as norma docendi, as authoritative principles of
instruction, for the faculty of law of the new University of Vir-
ginia. The question uppermost in their minds was how best to
educate the lawyers who were most likely to be the legislators,
executives, and judges of the future, those whose vocation
would make them in a peculiar sense the future guardians of
the Constitution and of republican freedom. Madison and Jef-
ferson were aware of the delicacy of proposing to tell the
professors what to teach. They would not think of doing so,
Jefferson said, in most of the branches of science in which the
university would offer instruction. And yet, he wrote, and
surely not without reason: "[T]here is one branch in which we
32. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.
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are the best judges... [i]t is that of government. 33
So these two ex-Presidents and Founding Fathers con-
cluded and recommended to the Board of Visitors, of which
both were members and Jefferson was President, that of the
"best guides" to the principles of the Constitutions of Virginia
and of the United States, the first was "the Declaration of
Independence as the fundamental act of Union of these
states."34 Let it be noted that Jefferson and Madison here
refer to the Declaration, not only as the instrument by which
the thirteen Colonies separated themselves from Great Britain,
but as the instrument by which they combined with each other
to become one Union-thirteen states indeed, but thirteen
states united. As the "fundamental act of Union," the Declara-
tion was and remains the fundamental legal instrument attest-
ing to the existence of the United States. From it all
subsequent acts of the people of the United States, including
the Constitution, are dated and authorized. It defines at once
the legal and the moral personality of that "one People" (who
are said to be a "good people") who separated themselves from
Great Britain and became free and independent. It thereby
also defines the source and nature of that authority that is
invoked when "[w]e the people of the United States" ordained
and established the Constitution. For the same principle of
authority-that of the people-that made the independence of
the states lawful, made lawful all the acts and things done sub-
sequently in their name. This tells us why the Constitution
ought to be obeyed, why we have a duty to obey it, and why,
and in what sense, it may be truly said that the voice of the
people is the voice of God. For these reasons, the Declaration
remains the most fundamental dimension of the law of the
Constitution. It is the Declaration that tells us why and in
what sense the government of the people is a government of
right and not merely of force. It is by virtue of the principles
of the Declaration that the Constitution must be said to reject
the thesis that justice is nothing but the interest of the
stronger. It is by virtue of the principles of the Declaration
that, in the words of Leo Strauss, "[t]he United States of
America may be said to be the only country in the world which
was founded in explicit opposition to Machiavellian
33. 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 460-61 (1903).
34. Id.; 9 THE WRITING OF JAMES MADISON 219-22 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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principles." 5
To repeat, the Declaration of Independence, as seen by
Jefferson and Madison, tells us why the political authority of
the United States is also a moral authority, and why the physi-
cal force by which the United States may protect and defend
itself is moral force and not merely the expression of collective
self-interest. Finally, it tells us why slavery must be regarded
as an anomaly, a necessary evil entailed upon the Constitution,
but not flowing from-or consistent with-its genuine
principles.
One would have thought that this opinion was canonical
since both the author of the Declaration and the Father of the
Constitution-who were also the third and fourth Presidents
of the United States-had agreed upon the Declaration of
Independence, both as the fundamental act of Union, and as a
guide to the principles of the Constitution. Yet in all the dis-
cussion of "original intent" it has apparently not occurred to
any of the luminaries of present-day conservative (or, of
course, liberal) jurisprudence even to consider it. Even in the
Attorney General's Constitution Day speech of 1985,36 in which
he declared the principles of the Declaration to be those of the
Constitution, this assertion of Madison and Jefferson, which
could have greatly strengthened his argument, was ignored. In
truth, however, the denial of what Jefferson and Madison
affirmed has been at the very core of constitutional theorizing
in contemporary American conservatism. The source of this
denial is not difficult to discover. It is found in the slavery con-
troversy that began not long after Jefferson and Madison had
passed from the scene. It is found in the fact that John C. Cal-
houn has been far more prominent in shaping American Con-
servatism-and indeed American legal thought generally-
than Jefferson or Madison.
37
35. L. STRAUSS, THOUGHTS ON MACHIAVELLI 13 (1984).
36. See supra, note 23 and accompanying text.
37. Judicial Studies, Cumberland, Virginia (a major conservative "thinktank" in
the Washington area) recently publicized as "The Defenders of the Constitution"
James Madison, John Marshall, Joseph Story, Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, and
Edmund Burke. Madison, Story, and Webster violently opposed Calhoun in the
Nullification Crisis of 1828-1833 (on grounds that Marshall certainly agreed with).
Madison's last years were largely preoccupied with refuting the theory of nullification.
The Madison of this conservative think tank (like Marshall, Story, and Webster) has
been sanitized of his opposition to Calhoun and his association with the natural rights
theory of the Declaration. Why Burke is called a defender of the American
Constitution is, I suspect, because he is identified (erroneously) as an enemy of the
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At the center of Calhoun's constitutionalism was his doc-
trine of state sovereignty and state's rights. The essence of the
doctrine of state sovereignty was no more an affirmation of the
legal rights and powers of the states, vis-a-vis the federal gov-
ernment, than it was a denial of "the fundamental principles of
the Revolution" 3"-as Madison called them in the 39th Federal-
ist. That is, the doctrine of the natural rights of individuals as
the source of the authority of the state and of civil society as
such. Calhoun's conception of sovereignty as set forth in his
Disquisition on Government39 was of a right that belonged to
the collective entity called the state (that is, of government
representing society). State sovereignty was sui generis, not
derived from any antecedent principle or right. Sovereignty,
however, as understood in the Declaration of Independence-
and in all the great documents of the Revolution-was origi-
nally, and by nature, the equal and unalienable possession of
individual human beings. The original equality of all human
beings was an equality of sovereignty; no man had more right
to rule another than the other had to rule him. The exercise
of the natural right to rule one's self is transferred voluntarily
to civil society by virtue of the social contract by which civil
society is originally constituted. In the words of the Massachu-
setts Bill of Rights, "[t]he body politic is formed by a voluntary
association of individuals; it is a social compact by which the
whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with
the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for
the common good."4 ° As noted above, James Madison repeated
over and over again, that "compact is the basis of all free gov-
ernment,"'4 1 implying that the ground of all legitimate author-
ity is social contract based upon natural equality. The ground
of all positive legal rights in civil society-above all, the right
to property-is the antecedent natural right grounded in natu-
ral equality that every person possesses in himself. This right
is a fortiori a right of each person to possess the fruit of his
doctrine of natural rights in the Declaration of Independence. What is most striking
about this gallery of honor, however, is the inclusion of that great enemy of the
Declaration-John C. Calhoun-and the exclusion of its greatest defender, Abraham
Lincoln.
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 250 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1982).
39. 4 J. CALHOUN, THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN (R. Cralle ed. 1854)
[hereinafter THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN].
40. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 107.
41. See WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 24.
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labor. The natural rights-to life, liberty, and property-are
the ground of all authority, all sovereignty, in civil society.
Calhoun's doctrine of state sovereignty, on the contrary,
rests upon the denial of any such antecedent natural rights.
No rights to life, liberty, or property have any existence
independent of society. In this respect-in their assigning an
absolute priority of the society over the individual-Calhoun
and Marx stand upon identical theoretical ground. Here is one
of the deepest causes for the stultification of the present day
conservative critique of communism. Conservatives most often
attack communism on the grounds of its rejection of Christian
revelation. But they do so in part because the "rationalism" of
communism so closely resembles their own. To disguise this
fact, they declare that "there is better guide than reason."42
This better guide, however, turns out to be not revelation, but
the collective prejudices of their communities on such subjects
as race, religion, and ethnicity, prejudices which they are at
once unwilling to abandon and unable to defend. They are
also-it needs to be said-prejudices utterly inconsistent with
Christianity.
A corollary of Calhoun's doctrine of state sovereignty was
what Abraham Lincoln called that "ingenious sophism"4 3 by
which, "any State of the Union may consistently with the
national Constitution, and therefore lawfully and peacefully,
withdraw from the Union without the consent of the Union or
of any other State."44 Calhoun's constitutionalism is frequently
represented as a defense of minority rights against "the
numerical majority."45 Secession, like nullification, has been
represented as a constitutional device to prevent the tyranny
of the majority. But having denied individual rights as the
basis of majority rule, how could Calhoun defend minority
rights as such? The minority with whose defense he was par-
ticularly concerned was the particular minority that had a
vested interest in that "peculiar institution," the institution of
human slavery. To say the least, it is paradoxical to identify a
42. Cf. M. BRADFORD, A BETTER GUIDE THAN REASON: STUDIES IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION.
43. BASLER, supra note 28, at 603.
44. Id,
45. Calhoun makes this the center of his argument in the Disquisition on
Government, in THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, supra note 39, and it has been
repeated countless times since then. But see the unconstitutional endorsement of
Calhoun by Lord Acton, Political Causes of the American Revolution, in ESSAYS IN
THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY.
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defense of slavery as a defense of minority rights.46
A major feature of the ante-bellum debate was the attack
by Calhoun and his followers upon the teaching of human
equality in the Declaration of Independence. While the Decla-
ration continued to be appealed to in public debate for its pro-
nouncement that the just powers of government are derived
from the consent of governed (secession was justified as a legit-
imate withdrawal of consent), the proposition that all men are
created equal was scorned and rejected. It was scorned and
rejected notwithstanding the fact that the equality of man is
the ground or reason for the requirement of consent. For if
there were an inequality among men, such as there is among
other species, there would be no reason for consent to give
legitimacy to government. No one asks his cattle (viz., chat-
tels), or his dog, horse, cow, or pig for its (or their) consent.
On the other hand, every human being has the indefensible
right to ask anyone proposing to exercise authority over him,
"why should I obey?" Every human being also has the identi-
cal right to reply with deleted expletives to such answers as
"because I am better than you are," or "because it is in my
interest that you should obey." The divorce of consent from
equality, which was at the heart of ante-bellum southern con-
stitutionalism, remains at the heart of conservative constitu-
tionalism to this very day.47
By denying the principles of equality, southern defenders
of slavery (e.g., Taney) denied that any constitutional distinc-
tion could be drawn between slave property and any other spe-
cies of property. They insisted, notwithstanding the
acknowledged anti-slavery views of most, if not all, of the
Founding Fathers, that those anti-slavery views had no consti-
tutional standing. What mattered was not the personal views
of the Founding Fathers on slavery, but the constitutional com-
mitment to slavery that had been "nominated in the bond" of
the Constitution.4" Constitutional morality constituted fidelity
to that bond. From the southern point of view in the ante-bel-
lum debate, the "original intentions" of the Founding Fathers
46. This, however, is what Calhounites, then and now, have always done. See
Meyer, Lincoln Without Rhetoric, NAT'L REVIEW, Aug. 24, 1965 at 725. Contra Jaffa,
Lincoln and the Cause of Freedom, NAT'L REVIEW, Sept. 21, 1965 at 827.
47. See, e.g., Bradford, The Heresy of Equality: Bradford Replies to Jaffa, MODERN
AGE, Winter 1976, at 62. "Equality as a moral or political imperative ... is the
antonym of every legitimate conservative principle." Id.
48. J. CALHOUN, 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 507 (R. Cralle ed. 1854).
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consisted of their commitment to constitutional morality,
something entirely independent of whatever private views they
(or others) may have entertained. For the southerners took
their stand on the Constitution as the moral and political
embodiment of union. Whatever denied the authority of that
bond-as the equality principle of the Declaration seemed to
do-must be of no power or effect in interpreting the Constitu-
tion. And so, on the southern side of the ante-bellum debate-
inherited by contemporary conservatism-the Declaration of
Independence was read out of the authoritative role it had in
the American political tradition for the entire Revolutionary
generation and most certainly for those who framed, and those
who ratified the Constitution of 1787.
Equally important to Calhoun's constitutionalism was the
denial of Jefferson's and Madison's assertion that the Declara-
tion of Independence was "the fundamental act of Union" of
the states.49 The idea that secession was a legal and constitu-
tional right, required that it be believed that the Union was
formed, not in 1776, but in 1787 and 1788, and solely by the acts
by which the states ratified the Constitution. From this, the
official constitutional theory underlying the formation of the
Confederacy, acts of secession were acts of deratification. The
Declaration, from Calhoun's point of view, created not one
union, but a league of thirteen separate and independent
states. All Confederate apologists, from Jefferson Davis and
Alexander Stephens to the late Willmoore Kendall, would
repeat this. Kendall would refer to "the baker's dozen" of
independent states resulting from the Declaration, 50 an expres-
sion repeated without question by Garry Wills (once a Kendall
disciple) in his recent book on the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, Inventing America.5 '
Taney's opinion in Dred Scott 52 is a sport of the parent
Calhounian stock. To give slavery the unequivocal moral sanc-
tion of the Constitution, Taney did not deny the authority of
the Declaration, as did Calhoun. Instead, Taney denied that
Negroes had been included in the proposition that all men are
created equal. He simply ignored the reference in the Declara-
49. See generally, J. CALHOUN, 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN CALHOUN (R. Cralle ed.
1854).
50. W. KENDALL, BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 90
(1970).
51. G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978).
52. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
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tion to "the laws of nature and of nature's God" 53 and treated
the principles set forth by the Declaration as if they were
merely human or positive rights or law. This is all the more
astonishing since, as a Roman Catholic, he should have had
some acquaintance with the Thomistic distinction between nat-
ural law and the human law, as well as the Aristolelian-Tho-
mistic conception of the role or prudence in mediating between
ends and means. He treated as irrelevant, despite the status
accorded Negroes by custom or positive law, the truth that by
nature they were certainly human. He simply ignored state-
ments concerning slavery, such as Jefferson's in the Notes on
Virginia by which it was certain beyond any possible doubt
that Negroes were included in the Declaration.' He admitted
that the meaning of the words of the Declaration in and of
themselves included all members of the human race, of
whatever color. But he denied that the Signers of the Declara-
tion could have meant what they said, because had they meant
it, they as moral men, he thought, would have immediately set
about abolishing slavery.
Taney's utterly absurd and mistaken belief that the rights
set forth in the Declaration of Independence were understood
to apply to whites only is today perhaps the most commonly
held view of the Founding. For example, the 1968 report of
the President's Commission on Crime and Civil Disorder held
"white racism" to be the chief cause of the evils the Commis-
sion had been charged to investigate.5 As evidence of the
endemic character of this racism, the Commission noted the
alleged fact that Negroes had not been included in the proposi-
tion of equality in the Declaration of Independence! The staff
director of the Commission relied, he said, on "expert" opinion.
This meant certain "New Left" (or "Black Power") historians.
Facts meant no more to these "scholars" than to their unsung
hero, Roger B. Taney. The agreement today between the radi-
cal Left and the radical Right (e.g., between the advocates of
Black Power and the Ku Klux Klan or White Citizens Coun-
cils) is striking. On neither side is there the least awareness of,
or concern with, statements such as Lincoln's on the pruden-
tial character of the relationship between the theory of the
53. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
54. 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276 (P. Ford ed. 1892-99).
55. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 81
(1968).
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Declaration and the practice of the Founding generation. Here
is how Lincoln, in 1857, met the objection that Negroes could
not have been included in the Declaration because the Found-
ing Fathers had not abolished slavery.
Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case,
admits that the language of the Declaration is broad enough
to include the whole human family, but he and Judge Doug-
las argue that the authors of that instrument did not intend
to include negroes, by the fact that they did not at once,
actually place them on an equality with the whites. Now
this grave argument comes to just nothing at all, by the
other fact, that they did not at once, or ever afterwards,
actually place all white people on an equality with one
another . . . . They did not mean to assert the obvious
untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality,
nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon
them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon.
They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforce-
ment of it might follow as fast as circumstances should per-
mit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free
society, which could be familiar to all, and revered by all,
constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even
though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated,
and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influ-
ence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all
people of all colors everywhere.56
A writer espousing the Justice Department's polemic against
"judicial activism" has recently denounced this passage from
Lincoln's speech on the Dred Scott decision as if it were a justi-
fication of Justice Brennan's evolving judicial conscience as a
mode of constitutional interpretation. But this is nonsense.
Lincoln is speaking of the meaning of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence apart from the Constitution and before there was a
Constitution. He is addressing the meaning of the Declaration
of Independence as the act of the Continental Congress, which
was a legislative, not a judicial body. He is discussing the
meaning of the Declaration as the authoritative statement by
the American people of the purposes to be served by whatever
government they might choose to institute. But that same
Declaration of Independence also speaks of the dictates of pru-
dence as the means by which the Declaration's principles are
to be implemented. The "standard maxim of free society" was,
56. BASLER, supra note 28, at 360.
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as the words assert, a maxim for society, for the political com-
munity, as a guide for the direction of public policy. The shap-
ing of which is, of course, primarily a function of legislative
prudence.
Lincolnian morality-the morality of the Founding
Fathers-was prudential. Principles are the necessary, but not
the sufficient condition, for deciding cases. We cannot decide
upon an intelligent policy to deal with slavery unless we know
that slavery, in principle, is morally wrong. But knowing that
it is wrong does not, of itself, tell us what to do about it. Pru-
dential morality means doing the most good, or the least evil,
in any given situation. As Lincoln once said, "I would consent
to any great evil, to avoid a greater one." 7 The guarantees
given to the institution of slavery in the Constitution were nec-
essary if the slave states were to acquiesce in the far stronger
central government proposed in the Constitution of 1787. Yet
it was better, so Lincoln thought, even from the most anti-slav-
ery point of view that there be such a stronger Union. For
only such a Union could-its guarantees to slavery notwith-
standing-place the institution as a whole "in the course of
ultimate extinction.""8 Purists might have formed a smaller
Union without slavery. But slavery itself would have grown
far greater. We cannot forbear noticing that the purpose Lin-
coln attributed to the Founding Fathers-long before he
became President-of containing slavery and placing it in
course of ultimate extinction, was fulfilled in his Presidency.
The idea of prudential morality-the morality celebrated
by Aristotle, Aquinas, Burke, and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence-found no favor with Taney and has little favor today.
Taney adopted the essentially Kantian view of supposing that
the Founding Fathers could not have meant what they said
about human equality, had they not acted upon it categorically.
That meant acting upon their alleged perception of the right-
ness or wrongness of each particular action, without regard to
the consequences. Moreover, Taney deduced the meaning of
the Fathers' words from what he believed to be the purport of
their actions. He paid no attention to what they said about
what they meant. He insisted upon his understanding of their
actions as the sole guide to the meaning of their words. This is
the same procedure used today by behavioral scientists and
57. BASLER, supra note 28, at 308-09.
58. Id. at 447.
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Marxist historians (or social scientists) and accounts at least in
part for the popularity of Taney's, rather than Lincoln's, inter-
pretation of the Declaration of Independence. But let us not
forget either that the reconciliation of slavery and the Found-
ing was first and foremost the work of Calhoun, and it is Cal-
houn's interpretation of the Founding which to this day
dominates American Conservatism.
In his speech on the Oregon Bill, June 27, 1848, Calhoun,
addressing the proposition "[t]hat all men are created equal,"
made these remarks.
All men are not created. According to the Bible, only two, a
man and a woman, ever were, and of these one was pro-
nounced subordinate to the other. All others have come into
the world by being born, and in no sense . . . either free or
equal .... [This proposition] was inserted in our Declaration
of Independence without any necessity. It made no part of
our justification in separating from the parent country ....
Breach of our chartered privileges, and lawless encroach-
ment on our acknowledged and well established rights by
the parent country, were the real causes, and of themselves
sufficient without resorting to any other, to justify the step.
Nor had they any weight in constructing the governments
which were substituted in the place of the colonial. They
were formed of the old materials and on practical and well-
established principles, borrowed for the most part from our
own experience and that of the country from which we
sprang.
5 9
The doctrine that the American Revolution was fought to
defend "our chartered privileges" has become canonical in
American Conservatism, replacing the principles of the Decla-
ration of Independence recognized by Jefferson and Madison
(and indeed by all the Founding Fathers). "Chartered privi-
leges" represent prescriptive rights, rights sanctioned by
usage-by custom or the mere lapse of time-but not by reason
or nature. It is a right in which the "ought" has been assimi-
lated by the "is," in which all right is positive right-which is,
of course, another way of saying that whatever is, is right, or
that "justice is nothing but the interest of the stronger." The
idea of prescription as the ground of right was of course wholly
favorable to the idea of the legitimacy and indefinite perpetua-
tion of slavery. After all, slavery, next to the family, is the old-
59. J. CALHOUN, 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 507 (R. Cralle ed. 1854).
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est and hence most prescriptively right social institution
known in human history.
Thus Irving Kristol, inaugurating the American Enterprise
Institute's Distinguished Lecture Series on the Bicentennial of
the United States, referred only obliquely to the great proposi-
tion that Calhoun had denounced openly. Kristol said that
"[t]o perceive the true purposes of the American Revolution it
is wise to ignore some of the more grandiloquent declamations
of the moment."6 °  According to Kristol one should instead
"look at the kinds of political activity the Revolution
unleashed,"'" above all at the state constitutions. (Notice the
resemblance to Taney's-"Look at what they did, not at what
they said"-interpretation of the Founding.) These constitu-
tions, said Kristol, "were for the most part merely revisions of
the pre-existing charters."62 The purpose of the American
Revolution, according to Kristol-speaking in the spirit and
very nearly in the words of Calhoun-"was to bring our polit-
ical institutions into a more perfect correspondence with an
actual 'American way of life' which no one even dreamed of
challenging."6 3 The late Martin Diamond, agreeing with the
late Willmoore Kendall, also insisted that the Declaration of
Independence offers "no guidance whatsoever" for the con-
struction of the constitutions, state or federal, that were
adopted after 1776.'
Recently, Judge Robert Bork has written that, "[o]ur con-
stitutional liberties arose out of historical experience ....
They do not rest upon any general theory. '6 5 Compare this
with Abraham Lincoln: "Public opinion on any subject always
has a 'central idea,' from which all its minor thoughts radiate
•... [t]he 'central idea' in our political public opinion at the
beginning was, and until recently has continued to be 'the
60. I. Kristol, The American Revolution as a Successful Resolution, in AMERICA'S




64. M. Diamond, The Revolution of Sober Expectation, in AMERICA'S CONTINUING
REVOLUTION 26 (1976). (Emphasis added.) This lecture followed Kristol's at the
America Enterprise Institute's Distinguished Lecture series on the Bicentennial of the
United States.
65. R. Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, a lecture at the
American Enterprise Institute (1984), reprinted in VIEWS FROM THE BENCH: THE
JUDICIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS (M. Cannon & D. O'Brien ed. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Bork].
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equality of men.' "66
Lincoln also characterized that central idea, central not
only to political public opinion but to a Constitution based
upon such opinion, (since "our government rests in public
opinion") as "an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all
times."67 Judge Bork, however, denounces all "[a]ttempts to
frame a theory that removes from democratic control areas of
life the framers intended to leave there . . . , [which attempts]
can only succeed if abstractions are regarded as overriding the
constitutional text and structure. ' 6' But it was precisely the
attention to "constitutional text and structure" praised by
Bork, attention divorced from the "abstractions of moral phi-
losophy" by which slavery was condemned, that led Taney to
his conclusions in Dred Scott. Yet Bork goes on to contrast the
American and French Revolutions, declaring that, "the out-
come for liberty was much less happy under the regime of 'the
rights of man.' "69
Since the doctrine of the rights of man (embracing as it
did "the abstractions of moral philosophy") was at least as
prominent a feature of the American Revolution as of the
French Revolution, one wonders whether Judge Bork has ever
read a single document of our Founding. Not only does the
Declaration of Independence proclaim the rights of man, but
eight of the thirteen revolutionary state constitutions do so.
Massachusetts, for example, proclaims that "[a]ll are born free
and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable
rights .... ,7 0 These assertions of abstract truths, "applicable to
all men and all times," were-Kristol and Bork to the contrary
notwithstanding-the very heart of the revolutionary activity,
at the state level no less than at the national level. And no one
questioned that it was so before the slavery controversy made
such abstractions so very inconvenient, and "history" began to
replace natural rights as the ground of political and of constitu-
tional theory. But our genuine history-and not the fictitious
history invented by the neo-Calhounites-places the doctrine
of the rights of man at the very center of our historical
experience.
Consider further the following from our recent and very
66. 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 385 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
67. BASLER, supra note 28, at 489 (emphasis added).
68. BORK, supra note 59, at 170.
69. Id.
70. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 107.
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distinguished Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirk-
patrick. Mrs. Kirkpatrick, celebrating Independence Day 1982,
declared in the pages of NATIONAL REVIEW that
[t]he freedom of the American people is based not on the
marvelous and inspiring slogans of Thomas Paine but, in
fact, on the careful web of restraints, of permission, of inter-
ests, of tradition woven by the Founding Fathers into the
Constitution and explained in The Federalist Papers. And
rooted, of course, in our concrete rights as Englishmen.7
1
Irving Kristol, in the bicentennial lecture referred to above,
called Tom Paine "an English radical who never really under-
stood America [and who] is especially worth ignoring. ''7 2 Here
is the Neo-Conservative dictum on Tom Paine, whose "Com-
mon Sense" was credited by no one less than George Washing-
ton for having given the greatest impulse to the movement for
independence, and who carried a musket in the Battle of Tren-
ton. Mrs. Kirkpatrick is less slighting of him than Kristol,
although it is worth recalling how "marvelous and inspiring"
some of Paine's words actually were. Think of what Church-
ill's We Will Fight on the Beaches speech meant to Great Brit-
ain in 1940.7' Think of what it must have meant to the
freezing soldiers-and their beleaguered Chief-at Valley
Forge to be told that
[t]hese are the times that try men's souls. The summer sol-
dier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from
the service of their country; but he that stands it now,
deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny
like hell is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation
with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the
triumph.7 4
This is the St. Crispin's Day speech of American history, wor-
thy of Shakespeare himself, and it ill beseems any American-
any lover of human freedom-to slight its author. The truth,
however, is that it is Jefferson who is being depreciated in the
slighting of Paine. But he is too large a figure to be attacked
directly. It is not the Rights of Man, but the Declaration of
71. J. Kirkpatrick, Why Not Abolish Ignorance (While we're at it), NAT'L REV.,
July 9, 1982, at 829 [hereinafter Abolish Ignorance].
72. Kristol, The Revolution of Sober Expectation, in AMERICAN CONTINUING
REVOLUTION 12 (1976).
73. W. CHURCHILL, BLOOD, SWEAT AND TEARS, 289, 297 (1941).
74. 2 THE LIFE WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE 283 (V. Van der Weyde ed. 1925).
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Independence that is the indirect object of their patronizing
condescension. While we are anxious to share with Mrs. Kirk-
patrick her admiration for the Constitution's "careful web of
restraints, of permission, of interests, of tradition," we would
like to know her explanation of the very prominent place of
human slavery in that web. Certainly article IV, section 2, par-
agraph 3, weaves a very careful "web of restraints" around
those unfortunate human beings who were attempting to
escape from bondage, and it gave careful recognition (as did
other sections of the Constitution) to the interests of slave-
holders (but not of the slaves). If, as Kristol says, it was true
that there was an actual American way of life that no one then
thought challenging, then no one thought of challenging
American slavery, certainly a most conspicuous feature of that
way of life in 1776 and 1787. To believe what Kristol believes
about this unquestioned American way of life, one would have
to read the documents of the period-including the Constitu-
tion-the same way Chief Justice Taney did in Dred Scott.
One must ask Mrs. Kirkpatrick, however, how she thinks
that her black fellow-citizens can discover their rights as
Americans "rooted" in their "concrete rights as Englishmen."75
Is she thinking of the concrete rights of slaves and free
Negroes in colonial America? Or is she thinking of the rights
embodied in the African slave trade before Independence, a
trade protected by the British Crown over the protests of colo-
nial Americans? The Declaration of Independence speaks of
the rights with which we are "endowed by our Creator."7
Does Mrs. Kirkpatrick believe that God is an Englishman? We
yield to no one in praise of "the Constitution... [as] explained
in The Federalist Papers."77 But I would like to know how
Mrs. Kirkpatrick explains the provisions of the original Consti-
tution cited by Taney to justify his view that the Constitution
permits no distinction between slave property and any other
form of property. I would like to know how she distinguishes
between the protection of slave property as an end of the Con-
stitution from any of the other ends of the Constitution. Are
not those "slogans" of which Mrs. Kirkpatrick speaks so lightly
(or the "grandiloquent declamations" dismissed by Irving Kris-
tol) precisely the reason why Madison and Jefferson turned
75. Abolish Ignorance, supra note 71, at 829.
76. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
77. Abolish Ignorance, supra note 71, at 829.
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first to the Declaration of Independence-and not to the Con-
stitution itself (or the Federalist)-to instruct the young law
students at the University of Virginia in the principles of the
Constitution? "A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in
pictures of silver.1
7 8
According to Abraham Lincoln
[t]he assertion of that principle ["that all men are created
equal"] ... was the word, 'fitly spoken" which has proved an"apple of gold" to us. The Union, and the Constitution, are
the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The
picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to
adorn and preserve it. The picture was made for the apple-
not the apple for the picture.7 9
That "abstract truth applicable to all men and all times,"8 " so
scorned by John C. Calhoun and his legion of present-day con-
servative epigones, was, according to Lincoln, what gave life
and meaning to the Constitution. It is what enables us to dis-
tinguish, in the Constitution of 1787, the principles of that Con-
stitution from its compromises. It is what enables us to say
that the securities given to slavery in the Constitution repre-
sent concessions for the sake of the stronger Union and are
ultimately in the interest of the antislavery cause itself. But
Lincoln is saying, albeit in poetic language, nothing that was
not implied in Madison's own judgment that the first place to
look for the principles of the Constitution was the Declaration
of Independence. How is it that Mrs. Kirkpatrick, so eloquent
in her praise of the Federalist, disregards the judgment of one
of its major authors in this most crucial of all respects?
In all the great documents of the American Revolution,
the equality of the natural rights of mankind is the fundamen-
tal doctrine to which appeal is made. Historical experience
was consulted by our revolutionary Fathers. But it did not,
indeed it could not, provide more than partial instruction in an
enterprise so novel in the most important respects. Madison
on at least one occasion called the Constitution-rather infelic-
itously-nondescript. 1 He did so, he said, because there was
no name yet for a form of government so unprecedented.
What was unprecedented, however, was not only the system of
78. Proverbs 2:11.
79. BASLER, supra note 28, at 513. [Lincoln's punctuation.]
80. BASLER, supra note 28, at 374-76.
81. 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 511 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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dual federalism of a government "partly national, partly fed-
eral," 2 but the attempt, as stated in the Federalist Number 1,
to establish "good government from reflection and choice.""3
This, of course, required that prudence-and hence experi-
ence-should be consulted. Experience may instruct us in
what is possible in given circumstances. But of itself it does
not tell us what is desirable. And what is prudent is what is
the more desirable among those alternatives that are possible.
Prudence, and history, must be in the service of philosophic
truth concerning the just and the unjust, the right and the
wrong, the good and the bad. It must be in the service of
"words fitly spoken."
The past, merely as past, was no prologue to the future for
our Revolutionary forbears. The past, merely a past, showed
mankind by and large "depending for their political constitu-
tions on accident and force." The decisive and salutary histori-
cal fact governing the formation of American republicanism,
according to George Washington in 1783, was that its founda-
tions "were not laid in the gloomy ages of ignorance and super-
stition, but at an epoch when the rights of mankind were
better understood and more clearly defined than at any other
period."8 4 The Burkeans among us are constantly praising, as
indeed they ought, the "funded wisdom of the past." But for
George Washington, it was equally important to distinguish the
ignorance and superstition of the past from its wisdom. His-
tory furnishes no lessons to those who do not have the criteria,
supplied by right reason, to distinguish the good things that
have happened from the bad things. During the Revolution,
Alexander Hamilton had declared that "[t]he sacred rights of
mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or
musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the
whole volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself,
and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power." 5
Without exception the Fathers held, as the Declaration of
Independence asserts, that the only legitimate purpose of gov-
ernment was to secure rights whose origin is antecedent to all
charters or human or positive laws. These rights are grounded
in "the laws of nature and of nature's God," 6 and as such
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 257 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke, ed. 1982).
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 3 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1982).
84. 10 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 265 (W. Ford ed. 1891).
85. 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 12 (1961).
86. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
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belong equally to all members of the human race. These rights
may have been recognized in good traditions. But it is not in
tradition as such that the ground of such rights is to be found.
Thus, Lincoln concluded that "[s]lavery is founded in the self-
ishness of man's nature--opposition to it in his love of justice.
These principles are an eternal antagonism. Repeal the Mis-
souri Compromise-repeal all compromises-repeal the Decla-
ration of Independence-repeal all past history, you still
cannot repeal human nature. 87
It cannot be emphasized too often that mere tradition car-
ried no authority, either to the Founding Fathers or to Abra-
ham Lincoln. The past, merely as past, encompassed "the
gloomy ages of ignorance and superstition."8 " It was in reason
and nature that the purposes or ends of government were to be
discovered. The ultimate ground of rights is first and foremost
a matter of cognition. ("We hold these truths to be self-evident
. ..") As such they are not a matter of volition. What belongs
to man as man is "unalienable" and, therefore, not subject to
deliberation. What makes legitimate civil society a voluntary
association is itself rooted in an unchanging human nature. We
do not reason together to decide whether we wish ourselves or
others to be, or to become, slaves. To be governed by reason
rather than will is to be governed by law rather than force.
For law in its essence is, as Aristotle said, "reason unaffected
by desire." 9
Let us submit facts to our candid countrymen. In the Let-
ters of the Massachusetts General Court (viz., the Massachu-
setts Colonial Legislature) to the British Ministry, it is said
over and over again, as it was on January 29, 1768:
That it is an essential, unalterable right, in nature, ingrafted
into the British Constitution, as a fundamental law, and ever
held sacred and irrevocable by the subjects within the realm
... that what is a man's own is absolutely his own; and that
no man hath a right to take it from him without his consent;
[and] may not the subjects of this province, with a decent
firmness . . .plead and maintain this natural constitutional
right?90
The substance of these Letters was incorporated into the
87. BASLER, supra note 28, at 309.
88. 10 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 265 (W. Ford ed. 1891).
89. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 92 (E. Barker trans. 1972) (Book III).
90. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 65.
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Massachusetts Circular Letter of February 11, 1768, drafted by
Sam Adams. Repeating much of the foregoing, it adds "[t]hat
the American Subjects may, therefore, exclusive of any consid-
eration of charter rights, with a decent firmness, adapted to
the character of free men and subjects, assert this natural and
constitutional right."91
In these assertions by Massachusetts in 1768 we may see
encapsulated the whole political theory of the American
Revolution-and of the Constitution of 1787 as a fruit of that
Revolution. "No taxation without representation." The prod-
uct of a man's labor is his own property. This right of property
is understood-as it is in Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Gov-
ernment-to be an extension of his right to life and to liberty.
In this there is a categorical condemnation in principle of all
slavery as a violation of the laws of nature. For slavery is
nothing but the most extreme form of taxation without repre-
sentation. Property as the fruit of one's labor is an "unalter-
able right in nature," and therefore belongs to all human
beings as human beings. With respect to it, therefore, all men
must be understood to be created equal. It belongs to subjects
of the British crown, not because they are British, but because
they are human. This natural right is said to have been
"grafted into the British Constitution."92 The right in question
is not deserving of respect because it is British. Rather, the
British Constitution deserves respect because it recognizes the
right. But the origin of the right is not the British Constitu-
tion. Its origin is in nature.
What these pristine documents of the Revolution assert is
in direct contradiction of Calhoun, as it is of Kristol, Bork,
Kirkpatrick, and the whole tribe of present day conservative
publicists. What these documents assert also contradicts the
greatest of all gurus of contemporary American conservatism,
Russell Kirk. For more than thirty years he has, with notable
success, pursued the path of John C. Calhoun in reading the
Declaration of Independence-and its reasoned teaching of
equal and universal natural and human rights--out of the
American political tradition. A summary of what one finds in
his many books is the following from the Introduction to a
recent reprint of Albert Jay Nock's Mr. Jefferson:
Nock's book has very little to say about the Declaration of
91. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
92. Massachusetts Circular letter by Samuel Adams (Feb. 11, 1768).
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Independence. That is as it should be, for the Declaration
really is not conspicuously American in its ideas or its
phrases, and not even characteristically Jeffersonian. As
Carl Becker sufficiently explains, the Declaration was meant
to persuade the court of France, and the philosophes of
Paris, that the Americans were sufficiently un-English to
deserve military assistance. Jefferson's Declaration is a suc-
cessful instrument of diplomacy; it is not a work of political
philosophy or an instrument of government, and Jefferson
himself said little about it after 1776.93
Think of it, the Declaration of Independence "not conspicu-
ously American." But if not the Declaration, what? Not Yan-
kee Doodle, not General Washington, not the Continental
Army, not the Minute Men, not Paul Revere, or the Old North
Church! For the conservative illuminati who rapturously
acclaim this doctrine it would seem that the only things "con-
spicuously American" are "our rights as Englishmen!" One
may wonder whether any greater foolishness has ever been
condensed into fewer words anywhere in the world's records of
writings on politics. As to Kirk attributing to Carl Becker the
opinion that in the Declaration Jefferson was diplomatically
fawning upon the French to persuade them that the Ameri-
cans were un-English, here is what Becker actually wrote:
Democratic impudence could not well go farther than to ask
the descendant of Louis XIV to approve a rebellion based
upon the theory that "governments derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed." If the French govern-
ment received the Declaration, it did so in spite of its polit-
ical philosophy because it could not forego the opportunity
to take a hand in disrupting the British empire.94
To this, one might add that some of the worst excesses of the
King of England denounced in the Declaration were among the
most ordinary practices of the French monarchy. That the
Declaration was welcomed by the philosophes for very differ-
ent reasons than those espoused by the French Court is cer-
tainly true. But neither the Court nor the French patrons of
the Enlightenment needed to be taught that the Americans
were "sufficiently un-English" now that they had expressed
their determination to reduce the British empire by the sepa-
93. Kirk, INTRODUCTION TO A. NOCK, MR. JEFFERSON (1983).
94. C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 230 (1942).
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ration from it of its most valuable portion-the thirteen
colonies.
Russell Kirk would have us believe that the doctrine of
the equal natural rights of mankind was introduced into the
rhetoric of the American Revolution by the Declaration, and
then only to please Frenchmen! Recently, he has written that
The Declaration of Independence, calculated to please Paris
and Versailles, had broken with the constitutional argument
of the Americans that had been advanced ever since the pas-
sage of the Stamp Act. Until 1776, protesting Americans had
pleaded that they were entitled to the rights of Englishmen,
as expressed in the British constitution, and particularly in
the Bill of Rights of 1689. But Jefferson's Declaration of
Independence had abandoned this tack-what did
Frenchmen care for the real or pretended rights of English-
men?-and had carried the American cause into the misty
debatable land of an abstract liberty, equality, fraternity.
95
One would think, from the foregoing, that when Paul Revere
called out, "[t]he British are coming," he meant that they were
coming to rescue us from French philosophy. But whatever it
was that Paul Revere meant to do, it is clear that Russell
Kirk-like John C. Calhoun before him-means to deliver us
from the pernicious and un-American abstractions of the Dec-
laration of Independence! And so we are again reminded of
Mrs. Kirkpatrick's belief that, not the rights of nature and of
nature's God, but the rights of Englishmen, are the "roots" of
the American Revolution. Such is the "Conservative" vision of
American history today.
What Russell Kirk asserts about the Declaration of Inde-
pendence "breaking" with the constitutional arguments that
the Americans had hitherto advanced in the quarrel with
Great Britain is sheer nonsense. Jefferson and the Congress
did not "abandon" any "tack" in abandoning the argument
regarding the rights of Englishmen. There was nothing in the
least "diplomatic" in their statement of principles, as Becker
notes, and what they said had nothing whatever to do with
conciliating Frenchmen. They said what they believed in the
most unequivocal and uncompromising language the world has
ever witnessed. We Americans have as much right to be proud
today of the fearlessness with which they asserted their convic-
95. Kirk, Burke and the United States Constitution, THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REV.,
Winter 1985-86, at 6.
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tions as of the courage with which they fought to uphold
them. They had indeed hitherto used arguments drawn from
the real or alleged principles of the British or English Consti-
tution-but always as reflections or embodiments of the more
fundamental laws of nature. Now, however, they were no
longer Englishmen! Hence, there could no longer be any legal
or political reason for grounding their actions-certainly not
the action by which they separated themselves from England-
in the laws of England. How in the world could Russell Kirk
have expected them to appeal to their rights under the laws of
England at the precise moment that they were telling the
world that they were no longer Englishmen?
That the second paragraph of the Declaration embodies a
concise but complete epitome of political philosophy has not, so
far as I know, been denied by anyone except Russell Kirk.
This is not to say that many-most notably the disciples of Cal-
houn and Marx-have not regarded it as false. Carl Becker, as
we have seen, refers to the Declaration as a work of political
philosophy as a matter of course. And we know that both
Madison and Jefferson regarded it as an instrument of govern-
ment when they called it "the fundamental act of union of
these states."9 That Jefferson, according to Kirk, "said little
about" the Declaration after 1776 is contradicted by the fact
that he together with Madison, agreed to require the faculty
and students at the law school of the University of Virginia to
look to it as the primary source of guidance in the principles of
the constitutions of both Virginia and the United States. Nor
is it consistent with the inscription Jefferson composed for his
tombstone, an inscription naming the three things by which he
wished most to be remembered. The first of these three things
was his authorship of the Declaration of Independence.
As we have seen, and shall see again, the abstract truths of
the Declaration, in one form of expression or another, were
present from the very beginning of American resistance. What
Massachusetts called a "natural and constitutional right" can
hardly be considered primarily or inherently British. It is by
definition a right of all who share in mankind's common
humanity. With respect to it, therefore, it must be true "that
all men are created equal." The doctrine of the Declaration
long antedates the decision for independence and in itself has
nothing whatever to do with the exigencies of diplomacy. In
96. 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 219-22 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Con-
gress, October 14, 1774, we are told "[t]hat the inhabitants of
the English colonies in North America, by the immutable laws
of nature, the principles of the English Constitution, and the
several charters or compacts, have the following Rights.
9 7
The ground for the authority of the ensuing rights is seen
in their order. First is nature, next the English Constitution,
and then the colonial charters. The constitution and the char-
ters reinforce the rights grounded in nature, but only because
they themselves incorporate and reflect that ground. Of
course, the Americans will appeal to rights grounded in Eng-
lish law as long as they regard themselves as English. Once
they cease to be English, however, the ground of their author-
ity, the right to be bound by laws of their own making, is solely
in virtue of those rights with which they have been "endowed
by their Creator," their rights under "the laws of nature and of
nature's God."
Long before the decision for independence, it was clear
that the ground of the American argument was not the Eng-
lish Constitution but "the immutable laws of nature.""8 As
long as the argument was addressed to the Crown, or to fellow
subjects of the Crown, the appeal to English law strengthened
their side of the political argument. But intrinsically, as dis-
tinct from politically, natural law always took precedence in
the order of importance. The primacy of rights and of right,
understood in the light of the laws of nature, was the argu-
ment of the American Revolution from the beginning. And
this argument must be understood to constitute the "original
intent" governing American constitutionalism, as it took shape
in the Convention and in the ratification process-and in the
adoption of the Bill of Rights that followed.
Irving Kristol, as we have noted, asks us to pay special
attention to the kinds of activity unleashed by the Revolution,
and in particular the kind found in the state constitutions.99
But characteristically he shows little familiarity with the docu-
ments to which he invites our attention. In saying that the
constitutions were for the most part "revisions of pre-existing
charters," he speaks truthfully. Like Calhoun (and Kirk,
97. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 83.
98. Id.
99. I. Kristol, The American Revolution as a Successful Revolution, in AMERICA'S
CONTINUING REVOLUTION 12 (1976).
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Kirkpatrick, and Bork), however, he ignores the relationship
asserted by the colonial Americans between those charters and
"the immutable laws of nature."1 ° ° Even more conspicuous is
the fact, to which we have already adverted, that when the
newly independent states drew up their constitutions they-or
at least eight of the thirteen-prefaced their constitutions with
elaborate and ringing statements of the natural law doctrine
upon which their positive law was founded. I have already
quoted from the Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1780, but I give
here the parallel beginning by Virginia, which actually pre-
ceded the Declaration of Independence by three weeks: "A
Declaration of rights made by the representatives of the good
people of Virginia, assembled in full and free convention;
which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the
basis and foundation of government.' 1 The first paragraph in
this declaration is as follows:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter
into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or
divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and lib-
erty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property,
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.10 2
What is distinctive-and indeed unprecedented, but also
characteristic-in Virginia's Revolutionary State constitution is
the unwillingness to mistake or confound the ground of
authority in reason and nature with that of prescription, cus-
tom, or tradition. For what is here called the "basis and foun-
dation of government" for themselves and their posterity is, ex
vi termini, the permanent or unchanging "basis and founda-
tion." It is not such a basis and foundation as is revealed in
Justice Brennan's emergent (or "arrived") evolutionary con-
science, nor is it one discovered in colonial charters, or any
authoritative written record as such. Historical experience
means experience in time, but what is permanent is recognized
as an intelligible necessity--or as grounded in an intelligible
necessity-outside of time. It is this understanding of what is
due to man as man, in and by human government, because of
what man is, that is the basis for the "original intentions"
properly so called of the Founding Fathers, whether in Vir-
100. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 83.
101. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 103.
102. Id
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ginia, in Massachusetts, or anywhere else in Revolutionary
America.
In asking what were the original intentions of the Found-
ing Fathers, we are asking what principles of moral and polit-
ical philosophy guided them. We are not asking their personal
judgments upon contingent matters. We are asking what were
those principles-those truths "applicable to all men and all
times"-to which they subscribed. The crisis of American con-
stitutionalism-the crisis of the West-lies precisely in the
denial that there are any such principles or truths. It is no less
a crisis in the heart of American conservatism than of Ameri-
can liberalism.
We return again to Irving Kristol's assertion that the aim
of the American Revolution was to harmonize our political
institutions with an "actual 'American way of life' which no
one even dreamed of challenging."' 3  Yet the American
Revolution unleashed a movement of reform perhaps unprece-
dented in human history. This movement proceeded on a
broad front. Once the connection with the British crown was
dissolved there was no motive for Americans to pretend that
their institutions were not, or ought not to be, as republican as
possible. Here again, Conservative writers have misled us.
The late Martin Diamond, in the lecture which followed Kris-
tol's in the American Enterprise Institute's Bicentennial
Series, wrote that "the Declaration holds George III 'unfit to
be the ruler of a free people,' not because he was a king, but
because he was a tyrannical king."'0 4 Diamond would have us
believe the Declaration is "neutral" as between the different
forms of government, and implies no brief against monarchy or
oligarchy or any other form of government, as such. But this is
to ignore the Whig theory by which Jefferson and the Con-
gress had interpreted the English Constitution and its monar-
chy. Here is how Jefferson addressed the British monarch in
A Summary View of the Rights of British America, a year
before independence:
[T]his his Majesty will think we have reason to expect
when he reflects that he is no more than chief officer of the
people, appointed by the laws, and circumscribed with defi-
103. I. Kristol, The American Revolution as a Successful Revolution, in AMERICA'S
CONTINUING REVOLUTION 13 (1976).
104. M. Diamond, The Revolution of Sober Expectation, in AMERICA'S CONTINUING
REVOLUTION 29 (1976).
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nite powers, to assist in working the great machine of gov-
ernment, erected for their use, and, consequently, subject to
their superintendance. °5
Clearly, Jefferson's characterization of the British monar-
chy is that of a republican chief executive. The eighteenth cen-
tury Whig theory of the British constitution-the theory
formed under the influence of John Locke by those who made
the Glorious Revolution- was that it was a republic under the
forms of a monarchy (just as today we would say that it is a
democracy under the forms of a monarchy). The American
Whigs were willing to pretend that the monarchical and aristo-
cratic or oligarchical features of the British constitution were
compatible with their natural rights, as a concession that any
people might prudently make "while evils are sufferable,"
rather than "abolishing the forms to which they are accus-
tomed." But when evils were no longer sufferable and revolu-
tion became necessary, prudence no longer dictated restraint to
Americans in making their institutions wholly republican.
Once Americans saw their liberties as no longer connected in
any way with their "rights as Englishmen," but dependent
solely upon their rights as men under the laws of nature, an
enormous energy for change and reform was released. The
direction that change was to take was toward far greater civil
and religious liberty and far greater popular or democratic
republicanism than the world had ever seen before. Let us
remember that by article IV of the Constitution, "[t]he United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican
form of government .. .,"o Given the many anomalies of the
Constitution-and none greater, of course, than slavery-it is
good to have Madison's and Jefferson's word that the princi-
ples of the Constitution and the principles of republicanism
(nowhere defined in the Constitution itself) are those of the
Declaration of Independence. From this we are enabled to say
that the principles of the Constitution condemn chattel slav-
ery, even as its compromises offer it a temporary security.
To repeat, after the American people had made good their
independence, there was no reason for them to continue any of
the aristocratic, or oligarchic, or monarchic features of the con-
stitution of the mother country. They proceeded to lay the ax
to both, as well as to the connection between church and state
105. 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 429 (P. Ford 1892-99).
106. U.S. CONST., art. IV.
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that had arisen in English history because the King had been
head of the church. The constitutional freedom of Englishmen
in England-and in America so long as Americans were Eng-
lish-was seen to subsist in that connection between crown and
church that was formed by Henry VIII's separation from
Rome. Henry's assumption of the headship of the Church of
England in the sixteenth century was, among other things, a
means of preventing the Pope from placing a Spanish (or
Hapsburg, other Catholic or foreign) prince on the English
throne. Henry's confiscation and re-distribution of the lands of
the monasteries (and other church lands) following the break
with Rome, formed a new propertied class in England, whose
title to their property was no better than the King's title as
head of the English Church. The union of church and state in
England was, therefore, an instrument of national indepen-
dence and national freedom.
Once America separated from England, the accidents of
Reformation history no longer carried the practical meaning in
America in regard to civil and religious liberty that they still
possessed in England. When Hamilton in the first number of
the Federalist speaks of the desirability of "establishing good
government from reflection and choice,"'1 7 rather than "for-
ever depending for our political constitutions on accident and
force," he is undoubtedly thinking of some of the accidental
features of the British Constitution, which, although happy in
their effects in Great Britain, would have been utterly irra-
tional in an independent America. The separation of church
and state, the election of both houses of bicameral legislatures
and of chief magistrates, state or federal, the steady broaden-
ing of the franchise, the ending of primogeniture and entail
(the legal foundation of hereditary aristocracy) were all conse-
quences of emancipating the principles of republican govern-
ment from any deference to, or dependence upon, the
constitution of England. All these are among the reasons Jef-
ferson and Madison believed that the principles of the Declara-
tion of Independence ought to be the norma docendi of the
faculty, and as such, taught to the law students at the Univer-
sity of Virginia as the principles of the constitutions of Virginia
and of the United States.
The assertion that the American Revolution was intended
to bring our institutions into a more perfect correspondence
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 3 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1982).
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with an actual American way of life "which no one even
dreamed of challenging" may be regarded as true-if some-
what hyperbolic-but in a sense of which Irving Kristol him-
self never dreamed. There was an American way of life that
was actually in the mind of the American people. That way of
life was expressed in the Declaration of Independence, which
Jefferson himself in 1825 declared to be "an expression of the
American mind."'0' It embodied that "standard maxim of a
free people" which should, as Lincoln said, steadily and contin-
uously augment "the happiness and value of life to all people
of all colors everywhere."'0 9 That the Great Seal of the United
States should proclaim the novus ordo saeculorum would be
sufficient evidence to everyone except the pseudo-Burkeans of
American Conservatism (who list Burke and Calhoun but not
Lincoln among the "Defenders of the Constitution") that the
Founding of the United States looked forward, not backwards.
We find ourselves [Lincoln wrote in 1838] under the govern-
ment of a system of political institutions, conducing more
essentially to the ends of civil and religious liberty, than any
of which the history of former times tells us.110
Since nothing in "the history of former times" can serve as
a model for our own "system of political institutions," ours is
not a way of life defined by tradition or prescription. Tradition
and prescription might be incorporated into the new regime:
experience was to be consulted, but there was to be no identifi-
cation of the old with the good, except as the old might justify
itself at the bar of reason and nature. One cannot too often
repeat Washington's words, that the foundations of American
government were "not laid in the gloomy ages of ignorance and
superstition . . . ."1n The American Revolution retained the
old Puritan dream of a City on a Hill. But this City-now
emphatically republican or democratic- was no longer defined
by the exclusive, revealed theology of the Puritans, but by the
inclusive, philanthropic, tolerant, but not less moral theology
of:
a benign religion, professed, indeed, and practiced in various
forms, yet all of them inculcating honesty, truth, temper-
ance, gratitude, and the love of man; acknowledging and
108. 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 118 (A. Bergh ed. 1907).
109. BASLER, supra note 28, at 361.
110. BASLER, supra note 28, at 76.
111. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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adoring an overruling Providence, which by all its dispensa-
tions proves that it delights in the happiness of man here
and his greater happiness hereafter .... 112
In one respect, the reforming impulse of the Revolution
fell short-and that was with respect to Negro slavery. As to
the American way of life that no one dreamed of challenging-
surely one of the most unfortunate historical characterizations
ever ventured-consider the following from The Revolutionary
Records of the State of Georgia."' At Darien, on the southern
border of settled Georgia, a group of citizens met in January of
1775 to align themselves with the rebellion against Great Brit-
ain. These Georgians, including slave owners, promulgated a
set of resolutions specifying both British evils and American
goals. This was the fifth resolution:
To show the world that we are not influenced by any con-
tracted or interested motives, but a general philanthropy for
all mankind of whatever climate, language, or complexion,
we hereby declare our disapprobation and abhorrence of the
unnatural practice of slavery in America (however the
uncultivated state of our country or other specious argument
may plead for it), as a practice founded in injustice and cru-
elty and highly dangerous to our liberties (as well as lives),
debasing part of our fellow creatures below men, and cor-
rupting the virtues and morals of the rest, and is laying the
basis of the liberty we contend for (and which we pray the
Almighty to continue to the latest posterity) upon a very
wrong foundation. We, therefore, resolve at all times to use
our utmost endeavors for the manumission of slaves in this
Colony, for the most safe and equitable footing for the mas-
ters and themselves.
114
This resolution is remarkable for saying nearly everything
that Jefferson's famous diatribe against slavery in the Notes on
Virginia says.115 But it is all the more remarkable for saying it
nearly eight years before the Notes on Virginia. Indeed, it is
some three months before Lexington and Concord and eight-
een months before independence. Moreover, it was made by
anonymous citizens, not by leaders of the Revolution or (as
Russell Kirk would have us think) by Francophile intellectu-
112. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 182.
113. REVOLUTIONARY RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA (1906).
114. Id.
115. 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276 (P. Ford ed. 1892-99).
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als. And the southern border of Georgia was very far from the
Quakers of Philadelphia or the radicals of Boston. Here is con-
clusive evidence of the popular roots of the belief in human
equality, conclusive proof that Taney could not have been
more wrong than when he said that, in the Revolutionary
period, it was a "fixed and universal opinion . .. which no one
thought of disputing or supposed open to dispute116 [that black
men were] beings of an inferior order . . .and so far inferior
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect . . . and that the negro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit." '117
I do not recollect a single piece of documentary evidence
to support Taney's contention, and all the evidence I have seen
from this period is fully consistent with the Georgia resolution.
The "prevailing" (not "fixed and universal") opinion of the
Revolutionary and Founding generation was expressed by
Alexander Stephens, Vice President of the Confederacy, in his
famous "Cornerstone Speech", delivered in Savannah, Georgia,
in April of 1861, before the firing on Fort Sumpter:
The prevailing ideas entertained by [Jefferson] and most of
the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old
Constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was
in violation of the laws of nature: that it was wrong in prin-
ciple, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil they
knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion of
that day was, that somehow or other, in the order of Provi-
dence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. 118
Here we have powerful witness against Taney (and against
Kirk, Kirkpatrick, Bork, et al.) and in favor of Lincoln's
account of political public opinion at the time of the Founding.
It is also of decisive importance with respect to the "original
intentions" of those who framed and those who ratified "the
old Constitution." It is authoritative, in part, because Stephens
speaks as a disciple of Calhoun's doctrine of state sovereignty.
But Stephens is more reliable than Calhoun himself on the
intention of the Framers of the Constitution of 1787, because
he no longer speaks as a citizen of the Union engaged in con-
troversy over the interpretation of the "old Constitution." Cal-
116. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
117. Id.
118. THE PoLITicAL HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION 103 (E. McPherson ed.
1865).
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houn had perversely denied the authority of the Founding
generation's conviction concerning the natural rights of man-
kind for the interpretation of the Constitution, because he
meant to have his own opinions (against natural equality, and
in favor of the "positive good" theory of slavery) substituted as
the genuine "original intent."
In his Discourse on the Constitution and Government of
the United States, Calhoun had systematically argued for the
superiority of his own understanding.119 He meant to have it
replace that of the Founding Fathers-as it has largely suc-
ceeded in doing in the minds of American Conservatives. His
followers (after his death in 1850) believed that that effort had
come to naught with the election of Abraham Lincoln. But
Calhoun's constitutionalism had triumphed nevertheless in the
framing of a new Constitution-that of the Confederate States
of America. But the Union victory in the Civil War canceled
that triumph.
Calhoun's heirs have, ever since, returned to the original
Calhounian project, of restoring his anti-anti-slavery view of
the Founding, and of the "original intent" of the Framers. Let
us remember that Stephens in the "Cornerstone Speech" is
speaking as Vice President of the Confederate States of
America at the high tide of Confederate optimism, when it was
not only hoped, but believed, that the separation of the states
would be both peaceful and permanent. That is to say, he
spoke before the American people and the world had come to
know what difference it made whether it was James Buchanan
or Abraham Lincoln, who as President of the United States,
declared secession to be unlawful and the Union unbroken.
After the Civil War was over and Stephens came to write
his classic Constitutional View of the Late War Between the
States, he pretended that slavery was not the real cause of the
conflict. The cause of the South, he then held, was its defense
of state rights, against the tyranny of the majority.120 How-
ever, it cannot be too often repeated that the defense of state
rights and the defense of slavery became one and the same
when Calhoun divorced the idea of sovereignty from any con-
nection with the natural rights of individual human beings. In
his "Cornerstone Speech," Stephens was, as we have seen,
119. J. CALHOUN, THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 15 (K. Cralle ed. 1851).
120. A. STEPHENS, CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES
(1868-72).
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entirely correct in his characterization of the thought of those
who framed and those who ratified "the old Constitution."
And in 1861 he was candid in contrasting that thought with the
thought of the founders of the new Confederacy.12 ' In the deci-
sive respect, said Stephens, the ideas of the "old" Fathers
were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assump-
tion of the equality of the races. This was an error .... Our
new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea;
its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests upon the great
truth that the negro is not the equal of the white man. That
slavery- the subordination to the superior race, is his natu-
ral and normal condition. This our new Government is the
first in the history of the world, based upon this great physi-
cal and moral truth. This truth has been slow in the process
of its development, like all other truths in the various
departments of science. 122
Stephens was not a pure legal positivist (like Chief Justice
Rehnquist). He did not reject the idea of nature--or the Crea-
tor-as the origin and source of political rights. But he
thought that the progress of science placed both nature and the
Creator in a newer and better light. In so thinking, he also
showed that the Confederacy--certainly in his mind-was the
very antithesis of a traditional society. On the contrary, in
breaking with "the old Constitution" in the name of science it
was more radically modern than any other. It is no accident
that this speech was delivered two years after the publication
of Darwin's Origin of Species:
The architect, in the construction of buildings, lays the foun-
dation with proper materials ... the substratum of our soci-
ety is made of the material fitted by nature for it, and by
experience we know that it is best, not only for the superior,
but for the inferior race that it should be so. It is indeed in
conformity with the ordinance of the Creator . .. [that] the
great objects of humanity are best attained when conformed
to His laws and decrees, in the formation of government, as
well as in all things else. Our Confederacy is founded upon
principles in strict conformity with these laws. This stone
which was 'first rejected by the first builders is become' 'the
chief stone of the corner' in our new edifice.123
121. THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION 103 (E. McPherson ed.
1865).
122. Id.
123. Id at 104.
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Let me clarify what Stephens just said. The "stone ...
rejected by the first builders" is the "great truth that the negro
is not the equal of the white man." "Scientific racism" may be
said to have been in its infancy in 1861, but we now know well
what it is when it is fully grown.
The idea of evolution as a feature of political-and not
only of biological-thought, in one manifestation or another,
had been looming every more prominently in the "climate of
opinion" of the nineteenth century. It undoubtedly received its
greatest impulse from Rousseau's 1754 Discourse on the Origin
and the Foundations of Inequality Among Men. But it was in
the course of the nineteenth century that it was transformed
from "philosophic" to "scientific" status. That is to say, it was
thus transformed at a time when science was achieving status
as the highest authority in human affairs, while philosophy
was being relegated into a minor academic discipline. Stephens
compares the discovery of the inequality of the races to Har-
vey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, as well as to the
discoveries of Galileo and Adam Smith. Here we see, as noted,
the early version of that "scientific racism" that came to its ful-
lest flower in Houston Stewart Chamberlain-and Adolph
Hitler. But we must not fail to notice as well the parallel of
Stephens' thought-no less than that of Calhoun-to that of
Karl Marx. Marx also rejected eighteenth century natural
rights teaching on the ground that it too had been superseded
by later scientific discoveries, most notably his own. For Marx,
the primacy of classes paralleled that of races. Whether as the
struggle of races (or nations) or as the struggle of classes, neo-
evolutionary social Darwinism became the predominant form
of late nineteenth century political thought. The crucial fact
about Calhoun, Marx, and the neo-Darwinian racists is their
denial of individual rights according to nature, and their asser-
tion of the primacy of society, whether as race, class, nation, or
as "concurrent" social grouping.
In my remarks above on Justice Brennan, 24 I observed
that it was "evolution" operating through the judge's con-
science which defined the genuine constitution, even if that
constitution differed from the explicit and unambiguous words
of the unamended written document. Contemporary liber-
alism-as represented by Justice Brennan, rejects the natural
rights teaching of the Founding for the same underlying rea-
124. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
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son that it was rejected by Calhoun and Stephens, viz., because
it has been superseded by the progress of "science." Jefferson
and Madison, the authors of the Declaration of Independence
and of the tenth and fifty first Federalist2 ' subscribed to a
conception of nature which modern liberals believe to have
been superseded by the great discoveries of Marx, Darwin, and
Freud. The modern liberal believes with his conservative
brother that society is in every fundamental respect antecedent
to the individual. He believes, therefore, that there can be no
individual "rights" which limit the scope or action of govern-
ment, because the "individual" whose rights are to be vindi-
cated, only exists in a hypothetical future, in a society
produced by their "reforming action." Modern liberalism and
modern conservatism thus viewed stand upon common ground.
They are mirror images of each other. They differ only as to
where Right and Left are located on the images.
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1982).
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APPENDIX A
Attorney General Meese, the Declaration,
and the Constitution
Attorney General Meese's speech at Dickinson College,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on September 17, 1985-Constitution
Day-was his "first address relating to the Bicentennial of our
Constitution."12 In this speech, the Attorney General asserted
unequivocally that the principles of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence are the principles of the Constitution. Since this is,
as we have seen, what Jefferson and Madison said,127 what Lin-
coln believed,128 and what I am convinced is the truth of the
matter, I wish this speech had been the occasion for greater
rejoicing. Unfortunately, the Attorney General's great and
true assertion about the relationship of the Declaration of
Independence to the Constitution was made in a desultory and
confused manner. It was made without any apparent aware-
ness that it was controversial: Indeed, that it is as controver-
sial today as at any time in our past including that of the Civil
War generation. He seemed oblivious of that rejection of the
Declaration so characteristic of conservative jurisprudence,
which I have so amply documented. Indeed, although Mr.
Meese is often referred to these days as the keeper of the con-
servative flame in the flickering Reagan "revolution," I am not
aware of a single instance in which Mr. Meese has persuaded
anyone, in or out of the Department of Justice, of the truth of
his contention concerning the relationship between the Decla-
ration and the Constitution. I do not know of a single one of
Mr. Meese's judicial nominees who supports this view. Most
conspicuous is its absolute rejection-in the name of radical
positivism and relativism-by the new Chief Justice Rehn-
quist. (Justice Rehnquist's opinions on this matter I have sub-
jected to critical examination in appendix C.)
Mr. Meese writes that "[t]he Civil War . .. was nothing
less than a war between brothers for the very soul of the
American Constitution-the principle of human equality ...
we have endured precisely because through that bitter conflict
126. E. Meese, Speech at Dickinson College (Sept. 17, 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Meese].
127. See supra text and accompanying note 33.
128. Id.
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our politics were forced to conform to our most ennobling prin-
ciples."' 29 The "very soul of the American Constitution" and
"our most ennobling principles" are contained-according to
Mr. Meese-in that paragraph of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence beginning "[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident
.... " Commenting on it, he observes that the rights with
which men are said to be endowed by their Creator are "rights
that existed in nature before governments and laws were ever
formed. As the physical world is governed by natural laws
such as gravity, so the political world is governed by other nat-
ural laws in the form of natural rights."'3 ° But we have here a
radical confusion between the concept of natural law as gov-
erning the physical, and as governing the political (or moral),
world. Gravity, as a law of the physical world, merely states an
invariant relationship between matter and motion. Matter
"obeys" the law of gravity because it cannot do otherwise.
Indeed, we have here two different, and in certain respects
opposite, conceptions both of nature and of reason, although
Mr. Meese appears to be unconscious of that difference.
In an article published in Imprimis entitled "The Moral
Foundations of Republican Government,' 13 1 an article, I
observe, that repeats textually much of the speech at Dickin-
son College, Mr. Meese injects this added gloss on his view of
the Founding Fathers:
[W]e first need to remember that our Founders lived in a
time of nearly unparalleled intellectual excitement. They
were the true children of the Enlightenment. They sought
to bring the new found faith in human reason to bear on
practical politics. Hobbes and Locke, Harrington and
Machiavelli, Smith and Montesquieu-these were the teach-
ers of our Founders. These were the authors of celebrated
works that had called into question long-prevailing views of
human nature and thus of politics. Our nation was created
in the light cast by these towering figures.
132
This seemingly academic assertion raises disturbing questions.
Leaving aside the other authors for the moment, in what sense
can it be said that Machiavelli was one of the teachers of the
Founders? Leo Strauss has written that "the United States of
129. Meese, supra note 126.
130. Id.
131. Meese, The Moral Foundations of Republican Government, IMPRIMIS, Sept.
1986 (Hillsdale College, Hillsdale, Michigan) [hereinafter The Moral Foundations].
132. Id.
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America may be said to be the only country in the world which
was founded in explicit opposition to Machiavellian princi-
ples."' 3 To which he has added that "contemporary tyranny
has its roots in Machiavelli's thought, in the Machiavellian
principle that the good end justifies any means."' 34 When Mr.
Meese speaks of a "new found faith in human reason," what is
implied, whether he knows it or not, is the faith in what rea-
son can accomplish when it is divorced from moral restraint. It
is curious that Mr. Meese mentions the names only of modern
philosophers as "the teachers of our Founders." Surely he
must have known that Jefferson, when writing to Henry Lee
(May 8, 1825) of the sources of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, mentioned "the elementary books of public right, as
Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc." By writing as he does of
a "new found faith in human reason,"''  Mr. Meese implies the
rejection of that old faith in human reason represented tran-
scendentally by Aristotle and Cicero, a faith in human reason
in which reason's concern for means is never divorced from
reason's concern with ends. The typically modern view, on the
other hand, implies that reason has nothing whatever to do
with ends, because ends-in the sense of good and bad, just and
unjust, right and wrong are themselves essentially
unknowable.
In the case of Hobbes, for example, the only ends recog-
nized as having any authority over reason are those that are
the objects of the strongest passions. It was Hobbes, after all,
who declared that tyranny was merely "kingship misliked."'13
One can hardly imagine language that more directly contra-
dicts the central thesis of the Declaration of Independence, a
document which itself continues a very old tradition that justi-
fies tyrannicide.
In Aristotle and Cicero, however, reason is inherent in
nature itself, and nature is understood to be a source of norms
of human conduct. The specifically modern view of nature is
one of mindless matter and energy with no end or purpose dis-
cernible by reason. Mr. Meese, by silently dropping Aristotle
and Cicero from Jefferson's enumeration, unknowingly gives
credit to the view that "the laws of nature and of nature's
God" referred to in the Declaration have no moral content
133. L. STRAUSS, THOUGHTS ON MACHIAVELLI, at 13-14 (19).
134. Id.
135. The Moral Foundations, supra note 131.
136. 3 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES 171 (W. Molesworth ed. 1839-45).
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whatever. This view would justify Chief Justice Taney (and
Senator Stephen A. Douglas) in maintaining that the proposi-
tion of equality meant only that the British in America were
equal to the British in Great Britain and had nothing to do
with black men or any other human beings! This view agrees
also with Justice Rehnquist when he writes that there is no
way to "logically demonstrate" that the judgments of any one
conscience" are superior to those of any other. 37 Above all, a
commitment to unalloyed modernity and to Machiavellianism
means a commitment to atheism. Walter Berns, for example,
who finds Hobbesianism at the core of the Founding, has
recently declared that there is a "parade of evidence . . . that
Washington, Jefferson, and Madison were opposed to revealed
religion and understood it to be incompatible with an attach-
ment to 'Nature's God.' "138 But if revealed religion-most
especially Christianity-is incompatible with "the rights of the
laws of nature," then it is incompatible with a government
devoted to securing such rights. Such a government must pur-
sue a policy designed to lessen, if not eliminate, the influence
of Christianity (and other revealed religions) in the minds of
the citizens of such government. That, according to Berns, was
the hidden agenda of "Washington, Jefferson, and Madison."' 39
Does Mr. Meese, who spends his spare time drafting constitu-
tional amendments authorizing school prayer, (prayer, I sup-
pose, directed for the most part to the God of revealed religion,
the God of the Bible) really believe such nonsense? Why then
does he place Machiavelli, but not Aristotle or Cicero, among
the teachers of the Founding Fathers?
The laws of the political world, unlike the laws of gravity,
or of "scientific" laws, generally, are laws only because they
can be disobeyed. But it is not only the case that political laws
can be disobeyed; it is also the case that there is a variety of
political laws on the human scene. Not only are there differ-
ent laws in different places at the same time, and different
laws in the same place at different times, but sometimes even
what may be called the same law--e.g., the law of the Consti-
137. See infra text and accompanying note 201.
138. Berns, Comments to Christian Politics and the Modern State, THIS WORLD,
Fall 1983, at 97-98. See also Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights of the Laws of
Nature, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 49 (thesis that rights and laws of nature, in the American
Founding are to be understood solely as derivative from Hobbes).
139. Berns, Comments to Christian Politics and the Modern State, THIS WORLD,
Fall 1983, at 97-98.
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tution of the United States-may be said to differ at different
times. For example, the law of the Constitution has both per-
mitted and forbidden human slavery and intoxicating liquors.
In the case of intoxicating liquors, it has permitted, forbidden,
and then permitted them again. It is an interesting question
whether "[w]e the people... " have the same inherent author-
ity to repeal the thirteenth, as to repeal the eighteenth, amend-
ment. If the sovereignty of the American people, or of any
people, can be rightfully exercised only in the service of the
inherent and unalienable rights with which all human beings
have been equally endowed by the laws of a moral and rational
nature, then there can be no rightful and lawful exercise of
sovereignty ultimately inconsistent with such ends.
Human reason investigates, but does not deliberate upon,
the physical laws of nature. And although there may be differ-
ences of opinion as to what the "laws" governing matter are, it
is supposed on all sides that there can be only one such law
governing any given phenomenon. But all moral and political
questions are-characteristically-matters of dispute. And
human beings deliberate in the face of moral and political
alternatives. For there is nothing in the moral or political uni-
verse that is not, as Aristotle says, "capable of being other-
wise. '  Men can be free, and men can be slaves. Men can
enslave their fellow men or emancipate them. Men can choose
death rather than slavery, or slavery rather than death. Which
is the better, red than dead, or dead than red? Which laws, or
moral injunctions, should be obeyed? Does calling laws or
rights natural laws or natural rights make them decisively
authoritative? Is not calling laws naturally right merely a rhe-
torical trick? Certainly, the natural rights doctrine of the Dec-
laration has had few adherents among the main line
conservatives who list John C. Calhoun, but not Abraham Lin-
coln, among the "Defenders of the Constitution."
Mr. Meese asserts, however, with Jefferson, Madison, and
Lincoln, that there exists "a natural standard for judging
whether governments are legitimate or not. That standard is
whether or not the government rests upon the consent of the
governed. Any political powers not derived from the consent
of the governed are, by the laws of nature, illegitimate and
hence unjust. '141
140. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Book 6, at 114a 30 (W.D. Ross trans. 1942).
141. Meese, supra note 126.
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Unfortunately, Mr. Meese has not been consistent in his
commitment to the ideas of natural rights and natural law
expressed in the Declaration of Independence. In a speech
delivered to the St. Louis University School of Law, September
12, 1986, Mr. Meese went out of his way to denounce the idea
of natural law as a standard for constitutional jurisprudence.'4
The speech as a whole was designed as a eulogy of the late Jus-
tice Hugo Black on the occasion of Black's 100th birthday. In
it the Attorney General singled out for praise Black's dissent
in the Griswold 143 case in which the Court ruled unconstitu-
tional a Connecticut statute that proscribed the use of birth
control devices and made it a criminal offense for anyone to
give information or instruction on their use.'" It was in this
case that the Court, speaking through the late Justice Douglas,
discovered a constitutional "right of privacy" among the "ema-
nations" and "penumbras" of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments. And it was this discovery of a right to pri-
vacy in the Griswold case that enabled the Court, in Roe v.
Wade,45 to further discover that a woman's right to an abor-
tion was within the compass of the right to privacy. One can
understand the Attorney General's desire to enlist the author-
ity of Black in his campaign against the legal foundations of
Roe v. Wade. But how can one account for this "Douglas's
opinion in Griswold allowing the Court to return to a most
constitutionally pernicious doctrine, that of resting constitu-
tional interpretation on the 'mysterious and uncertain' ground
of natural law.'
4 6
In the Dickinson College speech, as seen, the Attorney
General is unequivocal in asserting that the principles of the
Declaration of Independence as principles of natural law are
the principles of the Constitution. And, according to the Decla-
ration, the right to life is the first of the rights to be secured by
government under "the laws of nature and of nature's God."' 47
Mr. Meese, in the Dickinson speech, asserts that there is "a
natural standard for judging whether governments are legiti-
142. E. Meese, Speech at St. Louis University School of Law (Sept. 12, 1986).
143. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
144. Id. at 480. See also R. ROSSUM & G. TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
712 (1983).
145. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
146. Meese, supra note 126.
147. On the question of the relationship of the right to life, in the Declaration, and
the right to life, with respect to Roe v. Wade, see Lehrman, The Right to Life and the
Restoration of the American Republic, NAT'L REV. Aug. 29, 1986, at 25.
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mate or not.' 148 How can there be such a standard for declar-
ing the legitimacy of governments, but not one for declaring
whether the acts of government, in certain fundamental
respects, are legitimate? If it is true, that the principles of the
Declaration are the principles of the Constitution, then we do
not look outside the Constitution, but rather within it for the
natural law basis of constitutional interpretation. Justice
Black's attack on alleged appeals to the natural law, as a pre-
text for judicial usurpation, is based upon his positivist
prejudices against the idea of natural justice-against the cen-
tral idea of the American Founding and hence of the American
Constitution.
The St. Louis speech demonstrates that Mr. Meese's con-
stitutionalism sometimes becomes self-contradictory, if not
incoherent, in the presence of his passion against judicial activ-
ism. For example, he paraphrases with full approval the fol-
lowing from Black's dissent in Griswold:
[T]here is no provision in our Constitution which either
expressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a
supervisory agency over acts of duly constituted bodies and
set aside their laws because of the Court's belief that the
legislative policies adopted are unreasonable, unwise, arbi-
trary, capricious, or irrational.
1 49
Certainly, the Court has no right to set aside statutes as uncon-
stitutional merely because it regards them as unwise, or even
as arbitrary. But surely Mr. Meese (and Justice Black after he
left the Ku Klux Klan) would regard the Jim Crow laws of
many states, from the end of Reconstruction until the 1960's, to
be not only unreasonable and arbitrary, but utterly inconsis-
tent with the ends of free government and hence of the Consti-
tution. Mr. Meese himself in his Dickinson speech argues
against racially based quotas or preferences as follows:
"Counting by race is a form of racism. And racism is never
benign, never benevolent. It elevates a perverted notion of
equality and denies the original understanding of equality that
has guided our political thinking since we began as a
nation."'"5  When Mr. Meese speaks here of "the original
understanding of equality" he must refer to the Declaration of
148. See supra note 126.
149. Meese, supra note 126 (paraphrasing Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479,
512 (1965) (dissenting, Black, J.)).
150. Meese, supra note 126.
1987]
404 University of Puget Sound Law Review
Independence, since the words "equal" or "equality" do not
occur in the Constitution of 1787. The word "equal" enters the
text of the Constitution only with the fourteenth amendment.
The aforesaid "original understanding of equality" must then
be that of "the laws of nature and of nature's God." What
then, according Mr. Meese, is the constitutional status of this
"original understanding?" Here is Mr. Meese again:
In practice this principle means that there must be a regard
for individual rights; for by being created equal . . . each
person has dignity as an individual .... This original under-
standing of liberty and equality is undermined by those who
seek to claim group rights and to secure group remedies.
There are constitutional and legal obligations in the
United States to enforce the principle of nondiscrimination.
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment and the
various pieces of Civil Rights legislation demand it. This
principle is offended by policies that seek to bestow special
rewards on the basis of race or gender or any other immuta-
ble and morally irrelevant characteristic, just as it is
offended by policies that purposely deny opportunities on
the basis of race.1
5 1
Here Mr. Meese is categorical in asserting that the right not to
be discriminated against is an individual constitutional right
arising from the fact of being "created equal." The Attorney
General regards it as a constitutional right-at least since the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment-because it is a natural
right. And the fourteenth amendment is here seen as a mea-
sure that brings the Constitution as a whole more in conform-
ity with its original foundation in the natural law. This
foundation was flawed by the concessions to slavery arising
from "necessity" but not from "principle." If such is the case,
however, would not a legislative enactment discriminating on
the basis of race, by a state or by the United States, be an
unconstitutional violation of that right? Would not individuals
have the right to claim remedies for such discrimination in the
courts and finally in the Supreme Court? Does not Mr. Meese
here assert that the right of individuals not to be discriminated
against by race--or any other "morally irrelevant characteris-
tic"-flows from the original natural law intent of the Consti-
tution, embodied finally in the positive law of the Constitution
by the fourteenth amendment? Is not Mr. Meese right in
151. Id,
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asserting the Declaration's understanding of equality as the
basis for interpreting the fourteenth amendment in opposition
to Justice Brennan's wholly subjective "evolutionary" concep-
tion of "human dignity"? But is it not also the responsibility of
the courts to protect such rights against infringement by legis-
latures as well as by the action of the executive branch of gov-
ernment? Hence in such cases must not the Supreme Court
necessarily "sit as a supervisory agency over the acts of duly
constituted legislative bodies and set aside their laws." Of
course, it cannot do this if the Justices-as for example Justice
Brennan and Justice Rehnquist--do not accept what Mr.
Meese says here about the natural law conception of equality
as the ground of constitutional jurisprudence.
Mr. Meese is aware of the fact that in 1860 and 1861 eleven
states of the Union "deratified" the Constitution by acts of
"secession." In so doing they declared themselves to have
withdrawn their consent from the government of the Constitu-
tion of the Union. The subsequent exercise of the authority of
the Union over them was the result, they said, not of consent,
but of conquest. But "consent of the governed," Mr. Meese
says, "is a political concept that is the reciprocal of the idea of
equality. Because all men are created equal, nature does not
single out who is to govern and who is to be governed ....
Consent is the means whereby equality is made politically
operable."' 2 The foregoing statement goes to the root of the
meaning of both the Declaration and the Constitution. Mr.
Meese here asserts that consent gives rise to the "just powers
of government" only as the logical correlate-the "recipro-
cal"--of natural human equality. In doing so, he is indeed
expressing his agreement with Jefferson, Madison, and Lin-
coln. In doing so, he is also affirming that conception of
abstract truth, of reasoning about man and nature, as the very
ground and basis of all political rights that we have seen so cat-
egorically rejected by the main line of conservative thought.
For if consent is the reciprocal of equality, then the consent of
the Declaration of Independence is enlightened consent, and
consent properly so called cannot be granted to anything not
inherently consistent with the equality of rights of the con-
senting individuals. If consent is the reciprocal of equality,
then genuine consent implies a fundamental lirnitation--dis-
cernible by reason, and ultimately enforceable by the right of
152. Id
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revolution-upon the lawful powers of governments, whether
acting by majorities or otherwise. Consent properly so called
does not then arise merely from agreement, from consensus,
from "chartered rights," however ancient, or from community
sentiment divorced from the reasoned ground of natural law
and natural rights. Not tradition, or even the free vote of a
free people, can make slavery an institution that can be said to
be justified by the "consent of the governed." By this Mr.
Meese rejects Calhoun's argument of the right of any state, at
its pleasure, to secede from the Union. For Calhoun com-
pletely divorced the conception of the legal and political equal-
ity of the states from any connection with the natural equality
of human beings as such. In so doing, he grounded consent
entirely in will as distinct from reason. In denying natural
equality, he denied that concept of consent as the "reciprocal"
of equality affirmed by Mr. Meese. Hence Mr. Meese places
himself squarely on the side of Abraham Lincoln, as opposed
to that of John C. Calhoun (and Jefferson Davis), with regard
to secession as a constitutional right. For there cannot be a
constitutional right to carry out a purpose inconsistent with
the ends of constitutional government, which is what eleven
Southern states attempted to do in 1861.
Hence, Mr. Meese continues, "[t]his theory of government,
this philosophy of natural rights 53 is what made the institution
of slavery intolerable. For there is nothing that one can imag-
ine that denies the idea of natural equality as severely, as com-
pletely, as slavery."'" But if the institution of slavery was
"intolerable," how does Mr. Meese account for its presence
within the Constitution whose bicentennial we celebrate this
year? Here is what he says: "It is a common view that the
Framers of the Constitution made concessions to slavery ...
but that rather common view is, in fact, a common mistake.
The Constitution did not make fundamental concessions to
slavery at the level of principle."' 5 Mr. Meese sustains this
opinion by quoting Frederick Douglas, writing in 1863, as
follows:
I hold that the federal government was never, in its essence,
anything but an anti-slavery government. Abolish slavery
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need be altered. It was purposely so framed as to give no
claim, no sanction to the claim, of property in man .... 156
With all due respect, however, this is mere hyperbole and is
not sustained by the text of the Constitution itself. One can
speak of the "essence" of the ante-bellum federal government
being "anti-slavery" only if one is thinking of the doctrine of
universal human equality in the Declaration of Independence
as that essence. But the Constitution of 1787 does not
expressly repeat that doctrine, and the text is filled with "acci-
dents" that are very difficult to reconcile with such an
"essence." Or, to speak more precisely, the doctrine of the
Declaration is present in the Constitution only if one links the
opening words of the Preamble, "[w]e the people" with the
''one people" (who are also "the good people of these colonies")
of the Declaration.1 5 7 This, however, the Attorney General
fails to do. Failing to do so, he leaves unexplained the actual
provisions of the Constitution relating to slavery, above all
those provisions cited by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott.
158
I have already noted the clause that counted three-fifths of
a slave for purposes of representation. 5 9 I must again ask,
however, how can three-fifths of a person be counted, when
there is no such thing in nature. Is personality a creation of
positive law, or does positive law rest upon distinctions existing
in nature? We cannot fail to notice that the representation to
which the slaves contributed augmented the political power of
their masters and was, in fact, opposite to the interest of the
slaves themselves. Yet it is "representatives and direct taxes"
that are apportioned in article I, section 3. This clause actually
augments the representatives of the slave owning districts at
the same time that it augments their liability for direct taxes.
We must take note of this fact, even if it is true that direct
taxes were not levied before the Civil War. The "three-fifths"
clause initiates that treatment of the "personality" of the
slaves that is followed in the rest of the Constitution, which is,
that they are treated simultaneously as subhuman chattels and
as human persons. This is notwithstanding the fact that the
definition of a chattel as lacking a rational will and that of a
person as possessing a rational will are mutually exclusive.
156. Id.
157. Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
158. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
159. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, at 3.
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The most powerful evidence of slavery within the Consti-
tution, the most powerful evidence cited by Taney in Dred
Scott, is however article IV, section 2, paragraph 3:
No person held to service or labor in one State, under the
laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of
any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such ser-
vice or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party
to whom such service or labor may be due.' 6°
The passage is preceded, in article IV, by the Full Faith and
Credit, the Privileges and immunities, and the Criminal Extra-
dition Clauses. All three are modeled with only minor varia-
tions upon parallel passages in article IV of the Articles of
Confederation. But there is no precedent in the Articles for
the Fugitive Slave Clause. This massive addition of both power
and responsibility to the new government constitutes prima
facie evidence of what was meant by a "more perfect Union."
On its face, the Fugitive Slave Clause represents a change in
the fundamental law of the United States wholly favorable to
slavery. Not to recognize it as such, whether by Mr. Meese or
by ourselves, would be, as John Locke would say, "foolish as
well as dishonest." For not only does it give federal constitu-
tional recognition to the law of chattel slavery within the slave
states, but it requires the government of the United States to
assist in the enforcement of that law. This made the federal
government a partner in the maintenance of the institution of
slavery, which it would be disingenuous to deny. But there is
worse to come! The final section of article IV of the Constitu-
tion is as follows:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a republican form of government, and shall protect
each of them against invasion; and on application of the leg-
islature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic violence. 161
Here we have the greatest single stumbling block to the propo-
sition to which Jefferson, Madison, Lincoln, the Attorney Gen-
eral, and I subscribe: that the principles of the Declaration of
Independence are the principles of the Constitution. What is
that "republican form of government" guaranteed to each state
by the United States? To say that a republican form of govern-
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
161. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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ment is sufficiently defined as one in which "[n]o title of nobil-
ity shall be granted" would be silly and trivial. No people were
ever more alive to the differences between mere names and
the substance of reality than the Founding Fathers. The for-
bidding of titles of nobility was a necessary but far from a suf-
ficient condition for republicanism. Jefferson once declared
that the republican form of government was the only one not
secretly or openly at war with the rights of man. "To secure
these rights," e.g., to life and to liberty, is clearly the function
that the form of republican government is to serve. In the light
of this function, as Mr. Meese has declared, "the institution of
slavery [is] intolerable." However, by declaring that the
United States "shall guarantee" the republican form to every
state, the Constitution implies that every state then existing
was already republican. It implies thereby not only that there
was no "intolerable" conflict between slavery and republican-
ism, but that there was no conflict at all! And still worse fol-
lows. For the same sentence enjoining the guarantee, also
enjoins upon the United States the responsibility of protecting
each of the states against invasion and "domestic violence." As
a general proposition, one might say that this duty surely was a
leading purpose of any "more perfect Union." But protection
against "domestic violence" was also understood in 1787 to
apply to any efforts by the slaves towards their own freedom.
Taken in conjunction with the Fugitive Slave Clause, it meant
that the new government would use all its force to return
escaped slaves to captivity, and with that same force suppress
any efforts they might make towards freedom in the places of
their captivity. It would be committed to doing these things in
the very article in which it guarantees "a republican form of
government" to every state! This is the hardest of all nuts to
crack, if one is to successfully oppose the Calhoun-Taney inter-
pretation. Far more is required of us than the Attorney Gen-
eral's simple denial that the Constitution of 1787 made any
fundamental concessions to slavery at the level of principle.
Before fulfilling that requirement, however, we need to
complete the case against ourselves. In the words of Lord
Charnwood, the true obligation of impartiality is that one con-
ceal no fact that tells against one's own view. Article I, section
9 reads in part: "The migration or importation of such persons
as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit,
shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one
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thousand eight hundred and eight .. "..162 Mr. Meese, in
defending the anti-slavery character of the Constitution of 1787
says that it "made explicit provision for a time in the not-so-
distant future when Congress could seek to restrict not only
the slave trade but the institution itself." '163 But article I, sec-
tion 9 does not prohibit the foreign slave trade. On the con-
trary, it prohibits the prohibition of that trade by Congress for
twenty years. Moreover, it permits, but does not require, the
prohibition of that trade after twenty years. But what ground
does Mr. Meese have for saying that it seeks to restrict, not
only the foreign slave trade, but slavery itself? Some years
ago, Walter Berns argued very persuasively that the word
"migration" in the foregoing section of the Constitution, in
addition to "importation," was intended to give Congress power
over the interstate, no less than over the foreign slave trade
after twenty years."M Yet James Madison scotched that inter-
pretation in the first Congress, and not even Abraham Lincoln
ever claimed that the power of Congress to regulate commerce
among the several states (whether on the basis of article I, sec-
tion 8 or of article I, section 9) might be used to interfere with
interstate commerce in slaves. Lincoln, implicitly accepting
Madison's interpretation, took the guarantee embodied in the
Fugitive Slave Clause as a pledge not to use the commerce
power as the basis of an attack upon the existing institution of
slavery. 6 5 There is then no justification for the Attorney Gen-
eral's belief that article I, section 9, of the Constitution is evi-
dence of an intention to abolish slavery.
How then shall we defend the anti-slavery character of the
Constitution? We return to the Attorney General's misreading
of Dred Scott in which he abandons the principal ground upon
which the honor of the Constitution may truly be defended.
"The issue in Dred Scott," Mr. Meese writes in the Dickinson
speech,
was not whether slavery was right or wrong but only
whether Congress has the legitimate power to keep it out of
the new territories. Congress and Lincoln and Dred Scott
said Congress did have that power. The Supreme Court said
it did not. By declaring the Missouri Compromise unconsti-
tutional, the Court, in the view of some, made war
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
163. Meese, supra note 126.
164. Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE L.J. 198 (1968).
165. See genrally BASLER, supra note 28, at 579-589.
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inevitable.166
The truth is, however, that whether slavery was right or wrong
was the only important question in Dred Scott. In a letter
dated December 22, 1860, Lincoln wrote to his old friend Alex-
ander Stephens-soon to become Vice President of the Confed-
eracy-as follows: "You think slavery is right, and ought to be
extended; while we think it is wrong, and ought to be
restricted. That I suppose is the rub. It certainly is the only
substantial difference between us."'
1 67
What was "the only substantial difference" in the seces-
sion crisis was a fortiori "the only substantial difference" in
Dred Scott. Taney's opinion in Dred Scott turned upon the
judgment that those human persons denominated as chattels
by the laws of the slave states remained in the legal condition
of chattels after entering the Territories. They did so notwith-
standing the fact that the Territories, prior to statehood,
remained under the jurisdiction of the Congress and hence
under the authority of the fifth amendment to the Constitu-
tion that provides that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. ..- 168
The central question in Dred Scott was this: Which took prece-
dence when a slaveowner entered a Territory with his slave,
the Negro slave's human personality under "the laws of nature
and of nature's God," or his chatteldom under the laws of the
slave state whence he came? 16 9 Taney decided upon the latter,
and hence decided that under the fifth amendment the Negro
not only remained a slave in a territory, but that his owner was
entitled to the full protection of the government of the United
States to assure the enjoyment of his right of property in that
slave. 7 ° The only power conferred, namely, on Congress by
the Constitution, Taney had written, is the power coupled with
the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.'
7'
From the moment Taney issued this dictum, the deep South
regarded any failure of the government of the United States in
providing less protection to slave property than to any other
kind of property in the Territories to be an invidious discrimi-
nation between the different forms of property within the sev-
166. Meese, supra note 126.
167. BASLER, supra note 28, at 167.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
169. See genrerally 60 U.S. at 393.
170. See Id at 411-12.
171. See Id at 401.
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eral states, a discrimination not sanctioned by the Constitution
and inconsistent with the legal and political equality of the
states within the Union. Taney's opinion led directly to seces-
sion and civil war when the deep South insisted (and the upper
South later followed their lead) that the government of the
United States had a constitutional duty not only to permit the
ingress of slavery into the Territories, but that it also had the
duty to provide federal police protection of slavery there, if the
Territorial government failed to supply that protection.
The first, and in some respects the greatest, of the seces-
sion crises provoked by Dred Scott was the withdrawal of dele-
gates from the deep South from the Democratic National
Convention in Charleston in May of 1860. They withdrew in
protest against the refusal of the majority of the Convention to
adopt a plank calling for a federal slave code for the Territo-
ries. The Convention, under the leadership of Senator Stephen
A. Douglas (who would shortly become the Convention's nomi-
nee for President) refused, clinging to Douglas's popular sover-
eignty doctrine under which the protection of property of all
kinds in the Territories remained the responsibility of the leg-
islatures of the Territories, not of Congress. But Taney's opin-
ion in Dred Scott had undercut Douglas's doctrine of popular
sovereignty no less than it had undercut the Republican doc-
trine of Congressional exclusion. Yet Lincoln, in his debates
with Douglas and elsewhere, repeated endlessly that if Taney
was right (as Douglas said that he was) in holding that the
Negro slave remained a chattel in the Territories, then his
owner was entitled to the protection he demanded.172 There
was only one way to resist the consequences that the delegates
from the deep South drew from Taney's opinion in Dred Scott:
That was to deny the truth of the opinion. That opinion was in
itself fatal to the idea of constitutional freedom, not because it
was held by the Chief Justice of the United States and a major-
ity of the Court, but because the opinion was in itself destruc-
tive of constitutional government. In fact, the opinion would
have been equally pernicious, if not more pernicious, had it
been adopted by majorities in both houses of Congress as a
result of the ordinary operation of the political process. We
must remember that Hitler came to power by constitutional
processes. In short, we must hold that the word "person" in
the fifth amendment refers to a human person, a member of
172. BASLER, supra note 28, at 321.
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the species homo sapiens, without any further qualification. In
the law of the Constitution the meaning of personality that
must be given precedence is that of nature. Personality as such
must not be looked upon as a creature of positive law. Positive
law must reflect the truths of nature. If not, there is no person
who might not become an "unperson" by the same positive law
that regarded him as a person. And an "unperson" has no
right to life, liberty, or property. (A fractional person, I might
add, would have only fractional rights. And as rights are seen,
as they increasingly are seen, as group rights, they become by
this fact increasingly fractional.) In the ante-bellum Constitu-
tion, the positive law of the slave states, in making a natural
person into a conventional chattel, reversed the presumption
that governed the Constitution as a whole. Under their police
power, the states might depart from the normal (natural)
understanding of the rights of Negroes, because of circum-
stances in which it was judged that freedom for the slaves
would jeopardize what was believed to be a compelling and an
overriding interest in personal security of whites. Slavery, in
short, was justified as a necessary evil, a temporary departure
from a natural norm. Nothing in such a departure could, how-
ever, justify the extension of slavery, the bringing of this evil
into places where it did not already exist. The extension of
slavery could be justified only on the assumption that it was
either a "positive good," or that it was morally neither a good
nor evil. In short, one could justify the extension of slavery
only by the explicit rejection of the doctrine of natural human
equality.
The judgment in Dred Scott declaring the Missouri law of
1820 unconstitutional was, however, perfectly reasonable once
one conceded that the question of the Negro's personality was
purely a matter of positive law. It was reasonable, also, in light
of the 1850 legislation providing Territorial government for
Utah and New Mexico. Congress declared that the states to be
formed from these Territories "shall be received into the
Union, with or without slavery, as their constitution(s) may
prescribe at the time of their admission. "173 This was in itself
compromise language of utmost vacuity. The crucial question
was the status of slavery in the Territories before the framing
of the constitution with which the Territory would seek admis-
sion. The answer to this question was one upon which the
173. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 321.
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Congress could not agree. What they agreed upon was lan-
guage that declared that in any cases involving titles to slaves
in Utah or New Mexico, an appeal could be made directly from
the supreme court of the Territory to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Although Dred Scott as a case did not arise
in either Utah or New Mexico, Congress by this 1850 provision
of law effectively made the territorial question a judicial ques-
tion to be resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The meaning of the "republican form of government"
guaranteed to every state of the Union by the Constitution can
be understood only in light of the answer to the question of
who or what are the "persons" of which the Constitution
speaks. "Persons" are represented by the electoral process,
and "persons" have rights which are protected by law. There
is hardly space for a comprehensive consideration of this ques-
tion here.'74 Before the Civil War, however, the most acute
form of this question arose in Dred Scott. In judging that slav-
ery was unconstitutional in the Territories because it was mor-
ally wrong, and because it violated the principles of natural
justice in the Declaration of Independence, Abraham Lincoln
judged that slavery in the states where it existed lawfully was
an evil tolerated by necessity, not something either morally
indifferent or positively good. A state might then be republi-
can, even with slavery, so long as it assumed that slavery as
such was an evil, and that public policy was premised upon its
eventual extinction. 75 Only on such a premise could the Con-
stitution as a whole be regarded as anti-slavery. I think there
is ample evidence to document this understanding of the
Framer's intent in the Constitution of 1787. Perhaps no evi-
dence is stronger than that provided by Calhoun-in his ten-
dentious rejection of the Declaration and by the testimony of
Alexander Stephens in his "Cornerstone Speech" quoted
above. 17 This evidence comes into view, only when one under-
stands that the central question in Dred Scott had nothing to
do with the jurisdiction of Court and Congress, but only with
the question of whether slavery was right or wrong under "the
laws of nature and of nature's God."
174. On whether the principles of the Declaration of Independence are republican,
see H. JAFFA, How To THINK ABOUT THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 118-140 (1978).
175. BASLER, supra note 28, at 470.
176. THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION (E. McPherson ed. 1865).
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APPENDIX B
Are These Truths Now, Or Have They Ever
Been, Self-Evident? The Declaration of
Independence and The United States
of America on Their 211th Anniversary
Leszek Kolakowski, Professor at the University of Chicago
and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, began the 15th annual
Jefferson Lecture, in Washington, D.C., in April of 1986 as
follows:
Consider what is probably the most famous single sentence
ever written in the Western hemisphere: 'We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit
of Happiness'.... Immediately, we notice that what seemed
self-evident to Thomas Jefferson would appear either
patently false or meaningless and superstitious to most great
men who keep shaping our political imagination: to Aris-
totle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Marx and all his followers,
Nietzche, Weber, and for that matter, to most contemporary
political theorists.1 77
I would not speak as confidently as Professor Kolakowski
does of how those "great men" would have viewed the central
proposition of the Declaration (or, for that matter, of the Get-
tysburg Address), but Thomas Jefferson, in his unsophisticated
innocence, said that in the Declaration, he was placing "before
mankind the common sense of the subject," and that what he
wrote was an "expression of the American mind." He did not,
he said, aim at originality of any kind, but sought to give
expression to the "harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether
expressed in conversations, in letters, in printed essays or in
the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero,
Locke, Sidney, etc." Aristotle, I might observe, although long
known as "The Philosopher," was not a professional philoso-
pher like Professor Kolakowski. And professional philoso-
phers are notoriously incapable of understanding the language
of ordinary human beings, above all the language of ordinary
177. Kolakowski, speech at 15th Annual Jefferson Lecture, Washington, D.C.
(April 1, 1986).
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citizens, in the way that these human beings and citizens
themselves understand it. But Jefferson expressed the convic-
tions of his fellow citizens in language, which although
extraordinary in its eloquence, was recognized instantly by
them as representing their deepest convictions. These convic-
tions were at once peculiarly and profoundly American, while
peculiarly and profoundly representative of a natural law tra-
dition-a belief in objective norms of conduct for both men and
nations that lies at the root of everything making our human
existence civilized. But this was in the days before professional
philosophers, or "contemporary political theorists," had mined
and sapped the ordinary man's confidence in the vitality of
ordinary language and of the common sense moral judgments
upon which they, like Aristotle, had once relied.
Just before he died, Jefferson wrote that, "[a]ll eyes are
opened or opening to the rights of man... [and to] the palpa-
ble truth that the mass of mankind has not been born, with
saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred,
ready to ride them. . . ." A professional philosopher would, of
course, set to work immediately to point out that horses are
not born with saddles on their backs either. But Jefferson
knew, and his fellow-citizens knew, that the aristocrats of
Paris on the eve of the French Revolution regarded their peas-
ants in much the same light as human beings in general looked
upon horses-as an inferior order in nature whose highest pur-
pose in this world was to serve as beasts of burden to their
masters. Jefferson's fellow-citizens understood him to say, as
we might still understand him once we shake off the miasma
of the professional philosophers, that there is no such thing as
a natural or divine right of any man or class of human beings
to rule others. Legitimate government arises solely from a vol-
untary agreement embodied in laws binding rulers and ruled
by which it is understood that all government exists to secure
equally the natural rights of every citizen and the safety and
happiness of all. Government is not for the private advantage
of any self-anointed individual or class. Republican govern-
ment, the only form of government intrinsically compatible
with the rights of man, is government in which those who live
under the law share equally in making the law they live under,
and in which those who make the law are equally subject to
the laws that they make.
Let me elaborate upon the meaning of "all men are cre-
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ated equal," the proposition that Abraham Lincoln called the
"father of all moral principle among us," and the "central
idea" from which all the minor thoughts of our political tradi-
tion radiate. This proposition, although in terms no intelligent
human being in 1776 failed to understand, is indeed elliptical.
"Man equals man" would be true only because tautological.
Much is owing to the word "created," which implies a "Crea-
tor," who is mentioned almost immediately. (No doubt this is
what leads Professor Kolakowski to think that the sentence
would be looked upon as "superstituous" by the cognoscenti.)
"Created equal" implies such a relationship between man and
man as arises from a contemplation, not of man only, but of
the whole Creation. In looking at man in the light of the
whole Creation, we see him in comparison with what is lower
than humankind and with what is higher.
Although the existence of God is certainly implied by the
proposition that all men are created equal, it is not necessarily
implied. What is necessarily implied is not the Creator, but
Creation. In 1776 America, the language of the Bible was the
language of the ordinary man. There were sophisticates, as
Jefferson knew, who had considered that evolution, or the doc-
trine of the eternity of the universe, might offer alternative
explanations to that of the Bible. To everyone, however, Crea-
tion meant the world whose existence is known to us by sense
perception, and hence by such common nouns, or universals, as
light and darkness, heaven and earth, land and water, the birds
of the air, the fish of the sea, and the moving things, the ani-
mals, upon the land. Indeed, the world became an object of
knowledge, the world accessible to the senses, and from the
senses to the mind, was once familiar to most Americans as the
world of which they had read in the first chapter of Genesis.
To believe that this world actually exists is to believe nothing
more than the evidence of our senses. (Professional philoso-
phers, or most of them, at least since Hume, have systemati-
cally denied that our senses tell us anything reliable about the
external world.) To believe that this same world is the work
of the living God may be an act of faith. But for Jefferson and
his fellow-countrymen there was at least no disagreement that
such a world existed. Nor was there any disagreement that the
facts of this world, "these truths," held the key to the right
ordering of man's moral and political life. In the 26th verse of
the first chapter of Genesis, God said "[1]et us make man in our
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image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the
fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cat-
tle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that
creeps upon the earth."'78
For Jefferson and his contemporaries, there was no ques-
tion but that the differences in natures, differences inherent in
the distinctions the Bible itself draws between man and beast,
had implications (as in the Bible) that were no less moral than
metaphysical. Man had both power and right to exercise the
dominion that the Bible said had been given to him by God.
With that power and right went, of course, responsibility. Man
might not gratuitously destroy the resources of the lower
nature (John Locke had said that it would be foolish as well as
dishonest to do so): but he might use them prudently for his
own ends. There were no ends of the lower nature higher than
the ends that they might serve in serving man. But the rule of
a man over his horse or dog is by nature. Nature itself marks
out which is to be master, and which is to be servant. This,
believe it or not, is self-evident!
I recall a debate once with a prominent conservative who
denied that the proposition that all men are created equal (or
any other proposition) was in truth self-evident. Finally, I
asked him, was it not self-evident to him that he was not a
dog? His answer was, no. To this I responded that, since he
did not know that he was not a dog, he might not know that I
was not a fire hydrant, and I warned him to keep his distance.
I might have added that even if he did not know that he was
not a dog, there was no dog living that was so ignorant! In
truth, however, we have here an example of someone saying
what he could not possibly have believed, unless of course he
had become insane. But professional philosophers, and this
man suffering from this delusion, make a point of pretending
to forget what they actually know in order to maintain their
credentials as professional skeptics. By this they disprove the
possibility of philosophy itself as it was before the amateurs of
wisdom had been replaced by professionals. But such peculiar-
ities should have no weight with normal human beings who
can see instantly and without argument that men really are
not dogs, or gods.
The equality of man proclaimed by the Declaration of
Independence is to be understood first of all by comparison
178. Genesis 1:26.
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with the inequality that characterizes man's relationship with
the lower orders of living beings. In comparison with this ine-
quality there is nothing more evident, in the familiar words of
John Locke, than that no human being is marked out by
nature to rule, while others are marked out for subjection.
This does not mean that human beings are not distinguished by
such important marks as age, beauty, strength, intelligence, or
virtue. Nor does it mean that these differences, or some of
them, are not important in determining who should rule. But
the question who shall rule becomes relevant only after the
recognition that it is the rights of the whole community, and of
every member of that community for whose sake the govern-
ment is instituted. Who has courage, moderation, justice, and
wisdom to best serve the community becomes a question only
after the community is formed, and the rule of law enshrined
within it. It becomes a question only after there is an agree-
ment, voluntarily entered into, that the right each man has by
nature to govern himself will become valuable to him only as
he has transferred the exercise of that right to a government.
And a legitimate government is essentially the by-product of
an understanding that henceforth the power of all will defend
the right of each. Under the legitimate government of a civil
society, every man obeys the law for the reason that in doing
so he understands that he is enabling it to defend him, to
secure his rights. This so called "social contract" is the great-
est of all practical applications of the golden rule: "Do unto
others as you would have others do unto you."17 9 Human vir-
tue or excellence does indeed give some human beings, men or
women, the right to hold office, the right to rule. But it is a
right that can become valuable only as it is recognized as a
right, not to privileges, but to service. It is a right which comes
to light by virtue of the prior recognition of the equality of
mankind and of the rule of law constructed upon its premises.
That the political process by which such recognition is
made, may be an extremely defective one was recognized by
Winston Churchill when he said that "[d]emocracy is the very
worst form of government, except all those other forms that
have been tried. . .""' Its defects the fact reflect that if man is
higher than the beasts, he is very far from being God (or a
god). The idea of God belongs to natural, no less than to
179. Matthew 7:12.
180. The OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150 (3rd ed. 1979).
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revealed theology. This idea is formed by reflecting upon the
resemblances, as well as the differences, of man and beast.
Man is a compound of reason and passion. In beasts, instinct
controls the mechanism of the passions. Beasts are controlled
by reason only when they are controlled by human beings.
But man, although possessed of the appetites of the instincts,
knows that he has, by reason of his reason, the ability to con-
trol and direct instinct and passion alike. And he (that is
except professional philosophers) knows that with his reason,
he has been given to the ability to know good and bad, just and
unjust. That his reason is fallible is true: indeed, in nothing so
much does man show that he is a rational animal than in rec-
ognizing such fallibility. This fallibility is moreover two-fold:
First, in the difficulty in knowing amidst the complexity of
human affairs what is just or right; second, in doing what is
just or right. Knowing what is just or right also is exposed to a
two-fold difficulty: the one arising from the obscurity that
sometimes lies in the subject; the other (and most common)
arising not from the subject, but from the influence of the pas-
sions upon reason. King David did not see his sin when he
seized the wife of Uriah the Hittite and compassed Uriah's
death. But when the prophet Nathan presented his own story
to him disguised in a parable, he was exceedingly wrathful
against the offender. Only then did the prophet tell him who
the offender was. Then the King judged his own offense even
as God judged it, showing that the faculty of judgment was in
him, when his passion did not obscure the truth. 8 It is pre-
cisely because the human soul is a compound of reason and
passion that human wisdom prescribes the rule of law as fit-
ting the human condition. For the glory of the rule of law is
that it enables human reason to take into account the defects
of human nature and to transcend those very defects by taking
them into account. While human government needs human
wisdom in the highest degree, even the wisest men may be sub-
ject to that partiality that endangers justice. And even assum-
ing perfect impartiality, just judgments will be questioned by
those against whom the judgments are given. It is essential to
the stability of government that those judgments be given not
as the personal wisdom of the wise, but of the law. Only thus
can governments command the confidence of the governed.
The vote of the wise is then always for the rule, not of the
181. 2 Samuel 12:1-13.
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wise, but of the law. It is in the making of laws that the high-
est wisdom of the race is manifested. The meaning of law is to
be found, above all, in the understanding of the difference
between man and God. It is this difference, the reciprocal so to
speak of the difference between man and beast, which com-
pletes the meaning of what it is that we hold to be self-evident.
For further evidence of its self-evidence to our ancestors, evi-
dence that is as compelling today as it was in 1776, I turn to the
good citizens of Malden, Massachusetts who on May 27, 1776,
instructing their representatives in the Continental Congress
on a Declaration of Independence, wrote that an American
republic "is the only form of government which we wish to see
established; for we can never be willingly subject to any other
King than he who, being possessed of infinite wisdom, good-
ness and rectitude, is alone fit to possess unlimited power."182
The equality of mankind is then to be understood in the light
of this two-fold inequality: the inequality of man and the
lower order of Creation, on the one hand and the inequality of
man and God on the other. The contemplation of the very dif-
ferences between man and beast instructs us in what it is that
makes man by nature the master of beast. But the contempla-
tion of these same differences instructs us in man's imperfec-
tions. Man's wisdom, goodness, and rectitude are forever
limited by the fact that his passions are often at war with his
reason, and his self-interest with his goodness and rectitude.
Hence it is that no man is good enough, in Lincoln's words, to
govern another without his consent. For consent is the recip-
rocal of equality. And in the reciprocity of equality and consent
we find that ground of morality that Lincoln found in the
great proposition. The consent arising from equality assures,
as we said at the outset, that those who live under the law will
share in the making the law they live under, and that those
who make the law must live under the law that they make.
Constitutions are devices-inventions of prudence-to carry
into practice these principles. But except in the light of these
principles, a constitution is an empty vessel that can be a
means to any ends whatever. The utopianism that lies at the
root of all modern totalitarianism always presupposes the
denial or abandonment of human nature and that "great chain
of being" within which such nature is discovered. Unfortu-
nately, such abandonment is equally characteristic of present-
182. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 97-98.
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day conservatism and of present-day liberalism. A wise consti-
tution-such as ours--ceases to be wise the moment it is sepa-
rated from the principles that give it life. Man is by nature the
master of what is below him in the order of Creation. But his
ability to govern himself rests upon his recognition of what
God is, and hence of what he is not. That "all men are created
equal" means then that man is neither beast nor God. This is
indeed a self-evident truth. It is the ground of our Constitu-
tion, as it is the ground of all constitutionalism. It is the
supreme justification for the rule of law and, as Abraham Lin-
coln said, the greatest barrier against despotism ever conceived
by the human mind.
183
183. BASLER, supra note 28 488.
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APPENDIX C
Original Intent and Justice Rehnquist
The Wall Street Journal (August 7, 1986) carried an edito-
rial page article by Professor Bruce C. Ledewitz of Duquesne
University Law School entitled "The Questions Rehnquist
Hasn't Had to Answer." '184 Professor Ledewitz's theme is
expressed in the following excerpts.
We are about to elevate to Chief Justice . . . the greatest
judicial skeptic since Oliver Wendell Holmes. How truly
ironic it is that Ronald Reagan, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Rob-
ertson so strongly support ... a man who does not believe
there is such a thing as right and wrong .... Justice Rehn-
quist's jurisprudence may be characterized as legal positiv-
ism founded upon moral skepticism. He is unable to affirm
any substantive value as true or good, and so his constitu-
tional interpretation retreats to the search for an unobtain-
able, objective analysis of the "original intention" of the
framers of the constitution. Justice Rehnquist represents
not a triumph of conservatism, but a triumph of modernism.
As such, he is merely the most extreme and intellectually
honest representative of 20th century American law.18 1
I think Professor Ledewitz goes beyond his evidence in saying
that Justice Rehnquist "does not believe there is such a thing
as right and wrong." A man may think that there is no foun-
dation in reason for the distinction between right and wrong-
and this does, in fact, seem to be the Rehnquist view-while
still believing in the distinction itself. Carl Becker declared
that to ask whether the natural rights philosophy of the Decla-
ration was true or false was essentially a meaningless ques-
tion.1 8 6 Yet notwithstanding Becker's belief that reason was
impotent to answer the question of whether the philosophy of
the Declaration was true or false, he was himself passionately
committed to it. To Becker, the Declaration expressed a "fun-
damental reality" for which he, no less than George Washing-
ton, was willing to fight.'87 However, in saying that the
184. Ledewitz, The Questions Rehnquist Hasn't Had to Answer, Wall St. J., Aug. 7,
1986, at 26, col. 3 [hereinafter Ledewitz].
185. Id.
186. C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE Ch. 6 (1942).
187. Id.
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philosophy of the Declaration was grounded in a "fundamental
reality," Becker exposed himself to the objection that he was
calling something a fundamental reality that he also asserted
to be inaccessible to reason.188 If reality is inaccessible to rea-
son, how can we say it is reality? Becker was well aware,
when he came to write the Introduction to the 1942 edition of
his book (originally published twenty years earlier), that the
followers of Adolph Hitler looked upon the doctrines of their
leader with the same passionate commitment that Becker
looked to those of the Signers of the Declaration. What then
made the reality of Thomas Jefferson more fundamental than
that of Adolph Hitler? Becker could not say, even as he
declared his unqualified opposition to National Socialism. 89
This same difficulty must be faced by Justice Rehnquist.
It is, moreover, discouraging to learn that the new Chief Jus-
tice-in opposition to Attorney General Meese who, however,
appears to be completely unaware of this opposition-does not,
in the least, believe in the principles of the Declaration of
Independence either as myth or as reality. He does not believe
that we can say that despotism is intrinsically evil. Nor does
he believe that we can say that free government and the rule
of law are intrinsically good. All he can say about the former,
eg, is that Hitler's regime is in accordance with Nazi value
judgments, just as Bolshevik government is in accordance with
Bolshevik value judgments.' 9° In saying that Justice Rehn-
quist "retreats to the search for an unobtainable, objective
analysis of the 'original intention' of the framers of the Consti-
tution,"'' Professor Ledewitz is imputing to Justice Rehnquist
an impossibility. No one can at one and the same time be a
legal positivist and an adherent of the original intentions of the
Framers. For the Framers were very far from being either
moral skeptics or legal positivists. Their commitment to the
natural rights and natural law doctrine of the Declaration of
Independence represented the most profound of their original
intentions. It is simply a self-contradiction to assert that Jus-
tice Rehnquist is committed to the original intentions of the
Framers and to his version of moral skepticism and legal posi-
tivism, although this self-contradiction may indeed be Rehn-
188. Id.
189. Id. at Introduction.
190. See generally infra note 193.
191. Ledewitz, supra note 184.
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quist's, not Ledewitz's. But Professor Ledewitz is himself
profoundly mistaken, if he means to say that a genuinely
"objective analysis of the 'original intentions' of the Framers of
the Constitution" is "unobtainable."' 92 It would be unobtain-
able only if their understanding of the laws of nature, and of
the rights of man under these laws, was merely subjective.
But suppose that the Framers' understanding of the difference
between despotic and non-despotic government-recorded for
all time in the Declaration of Independence-is the true under-
standing. Suppose that their views of tyranny and despotism
were not merely subjectively held ("We hold these truths
... ."), but objectively valid. Would not an analysis of these
views not constitute an objective account of their most
profound and guiding intention in establishing a Constitution
to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their
posterity?
In his celebrated essay on "The Notion of a Living Consti-
tution,"'93 Justice Rehnquist takes to task those who
ignore... the nature of political value judgments in a demo-
cratic society. If such a society adopts a constitution and
incorporates in that constitution safeguards for individual
liberty, these safeguards do indeed take on a generalized
moral rightness or goodness. They assume a general social
acceptance neither because of any intrinsic worth nor
because of any unique origins in someone's idea of natural
justice but instead simply because they have been incorpo-
rated in a constitution by the people. 194
Here is the heart of that jurisprudence that Professor Ledewitz
rightly calls into question. A constitution-and law gener-
ally-is something "a society adopts," but which prior to adop-
tion has no "intrinsic worth." Among those things that prior
to adoption have no intrinsic worth are "safeguards for individ-
ual liberty." But Rehnquist does not say that even after adop-
tion these safeguards, and what they protect or secure, are
morally right or are possessed of intrinsic worth. He says they
192. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
193. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693, (1976)
[hereinafter Living Constitution]. This is the revised text of the ninth annual Will E.
Orgain Lecture, delivered at the University of Texas Law School on March 12, 1976.
Reprinted in TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY, 77 (1981). In 1985, Justice
Rehnquist published a slight abridged version of this essay. I assume, therefore, that it
still represents his opinions.
194. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 204.
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"take on" a kind of moral rightness. This means no more than
that they acquire a kind of veneer of opinion in their favor. I
am sure that Justice Rehnquist abhors as much as I do the
midnight visits of a Gestapo or of a KGB and the removal of
citizens from their homes to prisons merely because they are
personae non grata to the government. But Rehnquist will not
say that such arbitrariness is unreasonable, and wrong because
unreasonable. All he will say is that it is not in accordance
with our value judgments, although thoroughly in accordance
with Nazi or Bolshevik value judgments. But Nazi and Bolshe-
vik value judgments are incorporated in Nazi and Bolshevik
constitutions just as "our" value judgments are incorporated in
our Constitution. And all value judgments qua value judg-
ments are created equal! Rehnquist may perhaps object that
Nazi and Bolshevik constitutions are not acts of "the people."
But they are acts of the people, according to the Nazi and Bol-
shevik definitions of what constitutes a people.
The American definition of what constitutes a people is to
be found in the Declaration of Independence and asserts that
by the laws of nature and of nature's God all men are equally
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, and
that to secure these rights a people institute a government.195
By the principles of the Declaration a people that ignore these
rights in instituting its government are not, properly speaking,
a people. The Declaration preserves Plato, Cicero, and Augus-
tine's distinction between a people, properly so called, and
gang of robbers. But for Justice Rehnquist, this distinction is
itself just another "value judgment." By the principles of the
Declaration-by the principles that constitute the "original
intentions" of the Framers of the Constitution-the moral
rightness of "the safeguards of individual liberty" is prior to
and independent of its incorporation in a constitution by the
people. That moral rightness was found by the Signers of the
Declaration a priori in "the laws of nature and of nature's
God." If that moral rightness was not antecedent to the Consti-
tution, it could not exist in the Constitution. One cannot
repeat too often that the Founding Fathers were neither moral
skeptics nor legal positivists.
As I have noted, Justice Rehnquist has given no hint how
something that has no intrinsic worth becomes endowed with
"generalized moral rightness" merely because it has been
195. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
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"incorporated in a constitution by a people."' 9 6 The only intel-
ligible meaning one can assign to such an assertion is that a
powerful government can compel behavior consistent with its
laws. This means no more than that in obeying the laws we are
yielding to a superior force or that justice is the interest of the
stronger. But to most of us-and most certainly to the Found-
ing Fathers of this nation-"moral rightness" implies some-
thing very different. Morality implies voluntary action, not
compulsion. Constitutional morality implies that the individ-
ual rights safeguarded by the Constitution deserve a conscien-
tious respect and not merely a recognition that their disregard
will be punished. Rehnquist's assertion that adoption by a peo-
ple, or incorporation into a constitution, transforms "value
judgments" into "a form of moral goodness" is a non
sequitur.197 Someone who says that constitutional morality has
no other foundation than "value judgments" has nothing to say
to the man who does not share such "value judgments." If
such a man is strong enough to disobey the law of the Consti-
tution with impunity, and can do so, whether by corruption,
craft, or force, why should he not do so? To say that constitu-
tional morality has no other foundation than "value judg-
ments," is to say that the very idea of constitutional morality is
an illusion.
Bear in mind, moreover, that when I speak of safeguarding
individual rights or liberty, what I mean, first and foremost, is
preventing offenses against persons, property, and society such
as assault, murder, theft, rape, and perjury. According to
Rehnquist's logic, to call these things evil expresses "only per-
sonal moral judgments until in some way [they are] given the
sanction of law."' 98 In saying this, however, Rehnquist defies
the common sense of the human race, and incidentally of the
common law, that denies that these things are offensive
merely as "personal moral judgments." They are believed to
be prohibited because they are wrong and not wrong because
prohibited. Nor can it be said that these prohibitions merely
represent rules that have been useful: useful to whom? Or,
that these prohibitions contribute to the greatest good of the
greatest number. The argument from utility does not say why
anyone should obey these prohibitions who finds it useful or
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pleasant to disobey them, and who prefers what he regards as
his own good, to that of the greatest number of any number
other than one. The argument of American constitutionalism,
the argument of Jefferson and Lincoln and the Declaration of
Independence, is not a merely utilitarian argument. It is not
only an argument as to why the people have an interest in
preventing tyranny. It is ultimately an argument as to why
potential tyrants have an interest (a self-interest rightly under-
stood, in Tocqueville's phrase) in preferring morality to tyr-
anny. It is an argument as to why potential tyrants ought not
to become actual tyrants no matter what opportunities for des-
potism may arise. Lincoln's argument against American Negro
slavery was a demonstration that the principles of the Declara-
tion condemned any and every form of despotism.199 That
argument held that government under the rule of law is in the
interest of every man, because it is in accordance with the
nature of man, a nature that defines the limits within which
every human being must seek his good if he is to enjoy that
good. It is an argument that tyranny is bad for human beings
and hence is as bad for the tyrant as for everyone else. Jeffer-
son's diatribe against slavery in his Notes on Virginia held that
slavery corrupted the morals--and hence the well-being of the
masters.2 °° In this he only made explicit what was implicit in
the argument of the Declaration.
It is, of course, the common sense of mankind that moral-
ity, or at least that part of morality that consists in respecting
the rights of others, is for the most part ineffectual without
law. But morality without law is no more ineffectual than law
without morality. It is utterly absurd to suppose that "value
judgments" become morality by being adopted into law. If law,
or what is called law, became the authority for morality, as
Rehnquist seems to think, then Nazi or Bolshevik (or canni-
bal) law would result in the same "generalized moral rightness
or goodness" as the law of a constitutional democracy.
Perhaps Rehnquist would say that he was speaking only of
"the nature of political value judgments in a democratic soci-
ety." However, the sequel to the foregoing passage in "The
Notion of a Living Constitution" is as follows:
Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there is
199. See generally BASLER, supra note 28, at 360.
200. A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 278 (1944) [hereinafter KOCH].
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simply no basis other than the individual conscience of the
citizen that may serve as a platform for the launching of
moral judgments. There is no conceivable way in which I can
logically demonstrate to you that the judgments of my con-
science are superior to the judgments of your conscience,
and vice versa.
2 0 1
The key assertion here is that "there is no conceivable way in
which I can logically demonstrate to you that the judgments of
my conscience are superior to the judgments of your con-
science .... ." This is not a characterization of "political value
judgments" only or merely "in a democratic society." It is an
assertion concerning all such judgments by the human mind,
everywhere and always. Rehnquist implies by this that he
knows of no way in which any moral judgment, which is bound
to be a "value judgment," can be "logically" shown to be supe-
rior to any other moral judgment. Since all choices among
regimes, choices between Nazi or Bolshevik or cannibal or con-
stitutionally democratic regimes, are value judgments, no such
choice can be founded upon reason. This would mean, for
example, that there is no way in which the principle of a sys-
tem of laws guaranteeing religious liberty could be "logically"
shown to be superior to that of a system of religious bigotry.
Yet Jefferson and Madison, whose argument is an extension of
the argument of the Declaration of Independence, thought that
the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty did precisely what
Rehnquist thinks impossible. Rehnquist utterly disregards the
reasoned convictions of Jefferson and Madison (and the
Founding Fathers generally), which formed the guarantees of
the first amendment, but quotes with reverent admiration the
words of Justice Holmes "in his famous essay on natural law":
Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cocksure
of many things that were not so. . . . One cannot be
wrenched from the rocky crevices into which one is thrown
for many years without feeling that one is attacked in one's
life. What we most love and revere generally is determined
by early associations. I love granite rocks and barberry
bushes, no doubt because with them were my earliest joys
that reach back through the past eternity of my life. But
while one's experience thus makes certain preferences dog-
matic for oneself, recognition of how they came to be so
leaves one able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally
201. Living Constitution, supra note 11, at 704.
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dogmatic about something else. And again this means
skepticism.
20 2
This notable and notorious passage from Holmes's writing
extolling as it does the virtues of skepticism is swallowed by
Justice Rehnquist without the slightest trace of skepticism.
Can any reasonable human being put moral choice on the same
level as the preference for granite rocks and barberry bushes?
The preference for granite rocks and barberry bushes, however
passionate, is not a moral preference. Such preferences,
Holmes says, are "generally . . .determined by early associa-
tion. '20 3 If that is so, it is largely because they are largely mat-
ters of indifference to everyone except the person holding
them. But to say that one's opinions on matters of right and
wrong, e.g., the choice in 1940 between the cause of Adolph
Hitler and the cause of Winston Churchill, are arrived at (not
determined) simply by one's "early associations" is to deny any
role whatever to human reason or human freedom in shaping
human destiny. In fact, Holmes contradicts himself in the
foregoing. He says that "recognition of how they came to be,"
namely, "our preferences," enables us to be tolerant of the con-
trary opinions of others. But learning to be tolerant of the
opinions of others would not be possible, if our opinions are
simply determined by early associations, an Oedipus complex
or anything else. If we can learn to be tolerant of some opin-
ions that are different from our own, why cannot we learn to
be intolerant of other opinions? Does not tolerance by it very
nature engender an opposition to intolerance, especially for
racial and religious bigotry?
Holmes tells us that reason can emancipate us from simple
preference for our own opinions by showing us that different
opinions have the same cause. However, once someone recog-
nizes that opinions on moral questions differ, is he not bound
to wonder which of the contrary opinions is right, or whether
or not there is one non-contradictory truth underlying the
many contrary and sometimes contradictory opinions. That is
the thesis of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. This thesis is
reflected in the Declaration of Independence when it speaks of
"a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." It is what
Abraham Lincoln had in mind when he referred to the propo-
202. Living Constitution, supra note 11, at 704-05 (citing O.W. HOLMES, Natural
Law, in COLLECTED PAPERS 310, 311 (1920)).
203. Id.
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sition of human equality in the Declaration as "an abstract
truth, applicable to all men and all times."2 "4 That there is a
non-subjective morality of man, as man, is the necessary pre-
supposition of what we call Western civilization; it is the essen-
tial constitutive element of that civilization, a civilization that,
despite its name, is not understood as related to a particular
place any more than to a particular time. That there is such a
morality is also an absolutely necessary presupposition of the
Constitution of the United States of America, Holmes and his
disciple Rehnquist to the contrary notwithstanding. Any dis-
cussion of "original intent" apart from this morality is ulti-
mately vain.
Holmes (and Rehnquist) cannot grant to human reason
the first step in the emancipation of the self from a crude self-
preference and then declare that at that point all reasoning
must stop. (This, however, is what they do!) If we were simply
or merely "determined" in our moral preferences or "value
judgments," we would not be capable of that "recognition" of
what is common to ourselves and others of which Holmes him-
self speaks. Indeed, that recognition leads us away from mere
self-preference. Emancipation from mere self-preference is
then an essential element of our humanity. It is evidence that
we are not determined in our moral choices and that human
freedom is a reality. Political freedom would be meaningless if
there were not moral freedom, and moral freedom would be
meaningless if we were moved to action merely by sense per-
ception, memory, and imagination, which is what is implied in
Holmes's passage about barberry bushes and early associations.
Moral freedom must be based upon a metaphysical free-
dom of the mind that moves from mere sense perception to
reason and from reason to moral choice. The comparison of
alternative courses of action that constitute moral freedom
must follow from a fundamental comparison of ideas. In this
comparison, the human mind makes a judgment as to the cor-
respondence of abstract ideas with concrete phenomena. One
decides whether this is a plant or an animal, and whether this
animal belongs to this species or that one. (E.g., whether a
Negro or a Jew is properly placed in the species homo sapiens
with a white man or a gentile.) Only by this comparison of
ideas can one say that despotism, which fits the relationship of
204. R. BASLER, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 489 (1946)
[hereinafter BASLER].
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man to beast, does not fit the relationship of man to man. This
is the reasoning process that underlies and is embodied in the
condemnation of despotism in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. Without it, all our ideas of constitutional government
are vain and profitless. To repeat, the ability of the human
mind to recognize truth ("We hold these truths to be self-evi-
dent... .") is the metaphysical ground of the morality of the
Declaration of Independence. The universality of the rights of
humankind is the ground of all our constitutional morality
because it rests upon the recognition that reason is the defin-
ing characteristic of the human species. But we cannot assert
man's humanity as the ground of his rights, while denying the
reality of human freedom grounded upon abstract reasoning in
making human choices.
"Certitude is not the test of certainty" is one of those
sounding truisms that often does more to obscure than to
reveal what it propounds. 0 5 Leo Strauss expressed the same
thought when he declared that there is no difference between
the subjective certainty of the philosopher and that of the
madman. °6  Put somewhat differently, we might say that
Napoleon himself was never more certain that he was Napo-
leon than the poor inmate in the lunatic asylum who thinks he
is Napoleon. But notwithstanding the affectations of Holme-
sian skepticism, most of us will continue to believe in the
objective difference between being the historical Napoleon and
imagining one is that Napoleon. More generally, we must
attend to the objective difference between what is subjectively
persuasive to the sane man, and what is subjectively persuasive
to the lunatic. This difference turns upon the quality of the
evidence and of the reasoning that supports the opinions of the
one as opposed to the other. It implies that the sane man's
assertions can be confirmed by his peers and that in the pro-
cess of inter-subjective communication the grounds of objectiv-
ity can be discovered.
Someone familiar with the processes by which merely sub-
jective opinions may be replaced with objective truth knows
the difficulties and uncertainties that attend the exercise of
human reason. For this reason, the sane man is apt to be mod-
erate in his moral judgments. Moderation, moreover, is itself a
moral virtue. All the moral virtues are, moreover, in the ser-
205. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
206. L. STRAUSS, ON TYRRANNY 189 (1968).
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vice of human reason, including, most certainly, courage.
Holmes served honorably in the Union Army in the Civil War
and was wounded three times. It would be a travesty of his
sacrifices, as of the sacrifices of countless others, among them
those who came to their final rest upon the battlefield of Get-
tysburg, to say that they were "determined" in what they did
by their early associations or to imply that their or Holmes's
"preference" for the Union cause-for the cause of human
freedom in comparison with the cause of human slavery-was
not qualitatively different from a childhood preference for
granite rocks and barberry bushes.
The passage from Holmes's essay on natural law ends as a
eulogy to the virtues of skepticism. °7 But neither Holmes nor
his disciple Rehnquist seems aware of the genuine meaning of
that word. A skeptic is one who inquires. Inquiry, however,
presupposes doubt or an awareness of ignorance. Skepticism
implies a priori both doubt (or an awareness of ignorance) of
what one knows and faith or hope that by inquiring one can
remedy that defect. One is not a genuine skeptic, if one is cer-
tain a priori that one's doubt or ignorance cannot be remedied
by any process of thinking. If one is perfectly convinced, as
Rehnquist appears to be, that no one can employ reason ("logi-
cally demonstrate") to discover that any one moral judgment is
superior to any other (e.g., that one is justified in calling
Hitler's or Stalin's regimes "evil empires"), then he is "logi-
cally" free to adopt whatever moral judgment appeals to him
secure in the conviction that reason can never testify against
him. This radical skepticism, which is a false skepticism, leads
directly to radical dogmatism. If reason cannot rule against the
most insane moral preferences then there is no reason not to
adopt whatever opinions are most agreeable to one's passions.
I am reminded of a story in one of Hitler's biographies of
Himmler informing the Fuhrer of how the boxcar floors in
which thousands of Jews were transported had been covered
with lime. Himmler assured Hitler that all the Jews would
have been burned to death by the lime before reaching their
destination. Their deaths, moreover, would occur in circum-
stances of utmost pain and suffering as they would be steadily
and continuously seared by the corrosive chemicals while
packed and pressed together in unimaginable stench and filth.
As the story was told, both Hitler and Himmler began to laugh
207. See supra note 201-03 and accompanying text.
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and laugh ever more uproariously as they contemplated the
agonies of the Jews in the boxcars.2 °s Torturing and killing
Jews were the "granite rocks and barberry bushes" that they
loved and from which they certainly derived great enjoyment.
According to Justice Rehnquist, however, "there is no conceiv-
able way... [to] logically demonstrate" that the judgments of
our consciences on this matter are superior to the judgments of
Hitler's and Himmler's. °9 I conclude that radical skepticism as
patronized by Holmes and Rehnquist is something whereby
any reasoned conviction concerning morality is abolished.
Such skepticism is equally compatible with moral indifference
or moral fanaticism. But it has no connection with moderation
or tolerance-that "decent respect to the opinions of mankind"
that forms the core of the constitutional morality of the Amer-
ican Founding.
Rehnquist also denounces the idea of a "living constitu-
tion."21 By this he acknowledges a living constitution to be
one in which "the federal judiciary may address themselves to
a social problem simply because other branches of government
have failed or refused to do so."21' Rehnquist turns most
appropriately to John Marshall for his understanding of judi-
cial review under the Constitution:
All who have studied law, and many who have not, are
familiar with John Marshall's classic defense of judicial
review, in his opinion for the Court in Marbury v. Madison
212
The ultimate source of authority in this Nation, Mar-
shall said, is not Congress, not the states, not for that matter
the Supreme Court of the United States. The people are the
ultimate source of authority; they have parceled out the
authority that originally resided entirely with them by
adopting the original Constitution and by later amending
it.
2 1 3
It is worthwhile, at this point, to quote the key sentence by the
great Chief Justice in Marbury: "That the people have an
original right to establish, for their future government, such
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own
208. See generally R. PAINE, HITLER.
209. See Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 695.
210. See Living Constitution, supra note 193.
211. Id. at 695.
212. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
213. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 696.
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happiness is the basis on which the whole American fabric has
been erected.1
2 14
Now I do not believe there is the slightest room for doubt
that when Marshall penned those words, he had in mind and
everyone to whom he then addressed those words had in mind,
the following: "That ... it is the right of the people.., to insti-
tute new government, laying its foundation on such principles
and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their safety and happiness." '215 The resem-
blance of the language of the Declaration and that of Marbury
can no more be coincidental than the resemblance of the lan-
guage of the Declaration to certain passages in Locke's Second
Treatise. But according to the Declaration, and Locke, the
original right of the people as a collectivity is not original right
simply."1 Original right simply is grasped from the proposi-
tion that every human being is endowed by his Creator with
certain unalienable rights. A people, properly so called, arises
from the social contract or compact by which individual human
beings agree to form a civil society, a civil society in which the
citizens consent to be governed for the better security of their
original rights. The Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1780 makes
explicit the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence when
it says that "[t]he body-politic is formed by a voluntary associa-
tion of individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole
people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the
whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the
common good. 2 1 7
The underlying premise of this compact or contract is, as
with every valid contract, the equality of the contracting par-
ties. And so Massachusetts declares, as the United States had
already declared, that "[a]ll men are born free and equal, and
have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights ...."2181
To repeat, individual human beings could not form a body-poli-
tic, nor have a government whose "just powers" are derived
from their consent had there not been such an equality in the
original endowment of rights. It is that equal endowment of
natural rights under "the laws of nature and of nature's God,"
214. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 175-76.
215. Id
216. Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
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which makes "the people of the United States" (like the people
of the State of Massachusetts, or of any other state) something
other than an a mere numerical aggregate. Within the frame-
work of the laws of the United States and of the several states,
corporations may be chartered, but only for lawful purposes.
And so, men may incorporate themselves into civil societies,
but again only for purposes which are lawful by "the laws of
nature and of nature's God." The Framers of our Constitution
clearly and wisely believed that there must be a lawfulness
antecedent to positive law for positive law itself to be lawful.
When Justice Rehnquist says that constitutions do not have
any ground in any "idea of natural justice," '219 he is repudiating
the Framers and John Marshall, who followed them.
Here I am bound to say, although I am mortified to say it,
that the new Chief Justice of the United States accuses himself
of not understanding the very first premise of the Constitution
of the United States. By this I do not imply that he does not
understand many things about the Constitution. But viewed
either ordinally or cardinally, the very first premise of the
Constitution is found in the words "[w]e the people of the
United States .. ." with which is joined "do ordain and estab-
lish this Constitution for the United States."22 By Justice
Rehnquist's own testimony, given on the authority of Chief
Justice Marshall, the first constitutional premise is that "[tlhe
people are the ultimate source of authority .... .""' But Jus-
tice Rehnquist does not understand, indeed he denies, the only
ground upon which the people may be possessed of this author-
ity. For "the people," that is to say, "the good people" who
became independent, are not a collection of predators, a gang
of thieves. They are not the "people" of the Preamble merely
because they have called themselves by that name. They are a
people because they have incorporated into their association
with each other the morality of "the laws of nature." These
laws determine their purpose "to secure these rights" and
imply duties corresponding to these rights. The government
they may establish, however much in accordance with what
they may think conducive to "their safety and happiness," is
not a government which may trample upon the equal rights of
others at their pleasure. A people ignorant of their rights
219. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 704.
220. U.S. CONST., preamble.
221. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 696.
[Vol. 10:351
Appendix C: Original Intent
under the laws of nature are ignorant of the means by which
they may enjoy their freedom. This is what Jefferson had in
mind when he declared that for a people to be ignorant and
free is an impossibility.22 2 Majority rule is a rule for free gov-
ernment only to the extent to which the majority understands
itself as the trustee of the rights of the minority or minorities.
"An elective despotism was not the government we fought
for"22 is one of the axiomatic maxims of the authors of the
Declaration of Independence. To understand why this is so is
vital to understanding the Constitution. But it is not possible
to understand it, unless one understands why the moral basis
of both majority rule and minority rights is altogether antece-
dent to the positive law of the Constitution.
To repeat, what is first about the Constitution is the fact
and source of its authority. Before the Constitution, before the
Articles of Confederation, it had become necessary for "one
people" who were "the good people of these colonies" "to
assume... the separate and equal station to which the laws of
nature and of nature's God entitle them." '224 By their own
understanding, they had every right to which those laws enti-
tled them, but no right to anything those self-same laws did
not entitle them. Nor could they have consented to any gov-
ernment inconsistent with their remaining a "good people."
The "consent of the governed" from which "the just powers"
of government are derived is intelligent or enlightened con-
sent; it is not anything whatever to which men may agree.
There is no such thing as a right of a people under the laws of
nature to form Nazi or Bolshevik constitutions. Nor was there
a right simply to the institution of chattel slavery, albeit that
that institution did receive certain guarantees under the 1787
Constitution.
But these guarantees rested upon the premise that slavery
was an inherited evil so deeply rooted that it would require
some generations to overcome. The Father of the Constitution
declared that the words slave and slavery were carefully kept
out of the text of the Constitution (by elaborate euphemisms)
so that when the institution had finally disappeared, no trace
of its former existence would remain upon the Constitution's
face. The true miracle of the Founding is to be found in the
222. KOCH, supra note 200, at 394-95.
223. F. DONOVAN, THE THoMAs JEFFERSON PAPERS 101 (1963).
224. Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
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fact that a nation of slaveholders declared that all men are cre-
ated equal. It is found in the fact that the slaveholders emanci-
pated themselves from the barberry bushes and granite rocks
of their upbringing and declared that what was right in itself
would henceforth be the "standard maxim" for the free society
they were founding. That it took fourscore and seven years to
abolish the great anomaly of the Founding is hardly surprising
in itself. But it could never have happened had not the origi-
nal intent of the Constitution-in the laws of nature-pre-
vailed. Thus, Abraham Lincoln in his debates with Stephen A.
Douglas: [D]ouglas contends that whatever community wants
slaves had a right to have them. So they have, if it is not a
wrong. But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right
to do wrong.225
Lincoln, like Marshall, interpreting the Declaration as the
source of the principles of the Constitution, finds the authority
of the people as subject to the moral law and not prior to or
independent of that law. Neither Marshall, nor Lincoln, nor
any of the Founding Fathers ever imagined that morality was a
function of "social acceptance" in the wake of the adoption of a
constitution. On the contrary, a constitution was adopted
because of the prior acceptance of a morality whose foundation
was in the reason that recognized certain truths as self-evident.
The will of the people was a rational and moral will, not a
mere will. Here, I leave aside the matter of morality as the
revealed will of God, although certainly the great majority of
the American people at the Founding believed that morality
was known both by unassisted human reason and by divine
revelation. I leave it aside, not because it is unimportant, but
because the American people at the Founding believed that the
laws of nature instructed by unassisted human reason and the
revealed laws of God as they bore upon human conduct in civil
society were largely in agreement with each other. They did
not deem it wise to have this moral consensus undetermined
by theological differences. But the moral consensus itself
understood by the light of nature and supported in society by
the teachings of divine revelation was an absolutely necessary
condition of the idea of self-government.
I challenge the new Chief Justice to find a single docu-
ment from the Founding era illustrative of the thought of the
American people who ratified the Constitution that supports
225. Commager, supra note 25, at 363.
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the moral skepticism and legal positivism that he shares with
the late Justice Holmes. Indeed, it was the rise of this skepti-
cism and positivism in the generation before the Civil War that
repudiated the Founders view of slavery. It was the repudia-
tion of the moral foundation of constitutionalism that led to
the view that either slavery or freedom are wholly matters of
positive right, because natural right does not exist. This was
the deepest reason for the Civil War, and it is appalling that
the underlying view of the defenders of slavery should now
predominate in the Union preserved only by the destruction of
slavery.
Justice Rehnquist continues from the point I have quoted
above, saying
[i]n addition, Marshall said that if the popular branches of
government-state legislatures, the Congress, and the Presi-
dency--are operating within the authority granted to them
by the Constitution, their judgment and not that of the
Court must obviously prevail. When these branches over-
step the authority given them by the Constitution, in the
case of the President and the Congress, or invade protected
individual rights, and a constitutional challenge to their
action is raised in a lawsuit brought in federal court, the
Court must prefer the Constitution to the government
acts. 2
26
Rehnquist then goes on to declare that the
apogee of the living Constitution doctrine227 during the nine-
teenth century was the Supreme Court's decision in Dred
Scott v. Sanford .... 228 The Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Taney, held that Congress was without power to leg-
islate upon the issue of slavery even in a territory governed
by it .... Congress, the Court held, was virtually powerless
to check or limit the spread of the institution of slavery ....
The Court in Dred Scott decided that all of the agitation
and debate in Congress over the Missouri Compromise in
1820, over the Wilmot Proviso a generation later, and over
the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 had amounted to abso-
lutely nothing .... The decision had never been one that
Congress was entitled to make; it was one that the Court
226. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 696 (emphasis added).
227. That the Supreme Court may step in and do what the elected branches
should have done but did not do.
228. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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alone, in construing the Constitution, was empowered to
make.2
Rehnquist has misunderstood the case of Dred Scott in ways so
closely resembling those of the Attorney General, as I
described above both in the letter to Policy Review 2 0 and in
appendix A, that I strongly suspect that he is the source of Mr.
Meese's errors. Since Dred Scott turns altogether upon the
meaning of "[w]e the People... ," it is a case that Rehnquist is
unable to understand.
First notice that Rehnquist's historical survey jumps from
the Wilmot Proviso of 1847 to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of
1854, omitting mention of the Compromise of 1850 and the ter-
ritorial legislation thereof. As I noted above2 31 in the Acts for
Utah and New Mexico of that year, Congress was unable to
resolve the question of the legal status of slavery in those Ter-
ritories. There were at least three major differing opinions on
the question, the description and explanation of which would
require a separate monograph. The Acts provided that when
states formed from these Territories were admitted into the
Union, they would be so admitted "with or without slavery, as
their constitution may prescribe at the time of admission. '23 2
This is what Stephen A. Douglas in 1854 claimed as the justifi-
cation of his doctrine of popular sovereignty, which incorpo-
rated into the Kansas-Nebraska Act of that year.23 3 As I have
shown above, however, Congress left unsettled the crucial
question of what the legal status of slavery would be in the
Territory before the adoption of a state constitution. It was
generally understood that the status of slavery during the Ter-
ritorial period would determine whether the state constitution,
drawn up preparatory to entry into the Union would allow
slavery or prohibit it. That the "game" would be won or lost
during the Territorial period was something Lincoln never
tired of repeating during his speeches after 1854.234 It also
bears repetition that Congress in the 1850 Territorial legisla-
tion provided that any question involving title to a slave in a
Territory might be appealed from the Supreme Court of the
Territory directly to the Supreme Court of the United
229. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 701-02.
230. Letter from Harry V. Jaffa to the Editor, POL'Y REV., Spring 1986, at 84.
231. See text and accompanying note 173.
232. COMMAGER, supra note 217, at 321.
233. Id. at 331.
234. See generally BASLER, supra note 28, at 441-461.
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States. 3 5 In doing this, Congress, it might be said, laid the
baby on the doorstep of the Supreme Court, rang the bell, and
then disappeared. For Justice Rehnquist to speak of Dred
Scott as if it was a case purely and simply of judicial usurpation
is a sheer misreading of history.
The Court's decision, and Taney's opinion in Dred Scott,
were not merely gratuitous interventions in the political pro-
cess. Dred Scott did not declare unconstitutional any law cur-
rently in effect.236 Lincoln's House Divided speech of 1858 had
charged a conspiracy to extend slavery by four "workmen"-
Stephen, Franklin, Roger and James-two Presidents, a
United States Senator, and a Chief Justice of the United
States. 37 It was this alleged conspiracy, involving all three
branches of the government and not any unilateral action by
the Supreme Court that Lincoln directed his arguments
against in 1858. Rehnquist quotes from Lincoln's inaugural
address as follows:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people,
is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court,
the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between
parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be
their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned
their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.2 38
But Lincoln was not, as Rehnquist seems to think, attacking
the Court for having usurped powers belonging to the Con-
gress. He disagreed with the Court's decision in Dred Scott,
and his reasons for so doing were developed at great length in
virtually all his speeches in and after 1857 especially in his
debates with Douglas. In his inaugural address, however, his
argument is directed against those in the political community
who were attempting to exploit the Court's decision in order to
force the extension of slavery upon the country through the
political process. As I noted, it was the secession of the dele-
gates from the Deep South, from the Charleston Convention,
and from the National Democratic Party that set the pattern
235. IX Stat. p. 462 (1850).
236. The status of slavery in Minnesota Territory as a result of Dred Scott is,
however, open to question. See D. FEHRENBACKER; THE DRED ScOTT CASE 186 (1978).
237. BASLER, supra note 204, at 372.
238. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 702 (citing First Inaugural Address by
Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1961, in A. LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND LETrERs 171-72 (M.
Roe ed. 1894).
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followed later by those same states in attempting to "secede"
from the Union after Lincoln's election. In the secession ordi-
nances, it was the refusal of the North to accept Taney's obiter
dicta in Dred Scott as if they had been the very words of the
Constitution that constituted one of the paramount grievances
justifying secession. It was this use of Dred Scott, rather than
Dred Scott itself, to which Lincoln objected when he spoke the
words Rehnquist quoted. This is plain from what Lincoln says
in the immediate sequel.
Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the
judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink, to
decide cases properly brought before them; and it is no fault
of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political
purposes.2 3
9
To repeat, it was the "political purposes" of "others," not the
court's decision as such against which Lincoln's argument is
directed in his inaugural.
In speaking of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which repealed
the Missouri Compromise restriction of slavery three years
before the Court declared it unconstitutional, Rehnquist writes
as follows:
The enactment of the bill was, of course, a victory for the
proslavery forces in Congress and a defeat for those opposed
to the expansion of slavery. The great majority of the anti-
slavery groups, as strongly as they felt about the matter,
were still willing to live with the decision of Congress. They
were not willing, however, to live with the Dred Scott
decision. 240
Rehnquist's version of ante-bellum American history is, to
speak mildly, confused. I am not certain what he means by
"willing to live with." But the repeal of the slavery restriction
in the Missouri Compromise in the Kansas-Nebraska bill
raised the greatest political fire storm the Republic has ever
known. It brought Abraham Lincoln back into politics, and it
led to the formation of the Republican Party, which was
known for most of its first year of existence simply as the
Anti-Nebraska party.24' Its original purpose, and for some
time its sole purpose, was to restore the Missouri Compromise
239. BASLER, supra note 204, at 587.
240. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 701.
241. COMMAGER, supra note 25, at 329.
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restriction of slavery.2" I would not call this being "willing to
live the decision of Congress." By 1857, the Republicans, and
the free-soil coalition they engendered, already foresaw the
victory that had narrowly evaded them in the Presidential
election of 1856. When the Dred Scott decision was handed
down in 1857, all free-soilers howled their maledictions upon
the heads of Taney and his cohorts.243 But the soberer ones
among them, like Lincoln, made no attack upon the Court as
an institution, nor did they declare there was anything in the
political process that they were "not willing . . .to live with
.... "2 They meant to do no more, nor less, than to have the
decision reversed by a future Court by means of electing a
President and Congress of their persuasion. It was the prosla-
very party who could be said to be unwilling to "live with"
Dred Scott, because they would not "live with" its purely legal
results, but demanded that its obiter dicta be accepted by all
parts of the political community as rules binding upon their
political actions.2 4 5 It was the pro-slavery groups who, as I
have noted repeatedly, insisted that the political branches end
their discussion of slavery in the Territories and accept Taney's
opinion in all its aspects as binding upon their political decision
making.246 Their answer to the refusal of the American people
to accept Taney's dictum as a political rule was secession.2 47
That is what "not willing to live with" something really meant.
It had nothing whatever to do with the question of the jurisdic-
tion of the Court vis-a-vis that of the Congress.
I noted above Rehnquist's assertion that according to
Taney's opinion "Congress was without power to legislate upon
the issue of slavery even in a Territory governed by it .. .. "248
But this is inaccurate. Taney said that Congress did have the
power of legislation, "coupled with the duty of guarding and
protecting the owner in his rights. 249 It could legislate for
slavery in the Territories, but not against it. This was the
obverse of the free soil view, which was Lincoln's, that Con-
gress could legislate against slavery in the Territories, but not
242. Id. at 363.
243. D. FEHRENBACKER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 417 (1978).
244. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 701.
245. Id.
246. See e.g., Jefferson Davis' Senate Resolutions cited by D. FEHRENBACHER, THE
DRED SCOTT CASE 531.
247. See generally D. FEHRENBACKER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE (1978).
248. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 701.
249. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.
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for it. At no point did the dispute take the form which Rehn-
quist would like to think that it took: which branch of the gov-
ernment, the Congress or the Court ought to decide the
question of slavery in the Territories. Before secession, each
side wanted Congress to adopt its view of the legality of slav-
ery in the Territories, and each side wished, if possible, to have
its view endorsed by the Court. Abraham Lincoln would have
had no objection whatever to any alleged intrusion of the judi-
ciary into political or legislative decision making had the Taney
court decided Dred Scott in accordance with the free soil
understanding of the Constitution. Lincoln would have been
happy to have the Court decide both that Dred Scott was free
and that Congress had the power, coupled with the duty, of
guaranteeing freedom in the Territories. Lincoln believed that
the natural condition of the Territories was freedom, but that
it was prudent for Congress to make explicit what was implicit
constitutional law.
What then was the fundamental question in Dred Scott? I
have written upon this so many times that I hesitate to bore
my audience, if not myself, by doing so again.25° What I have
written, however, seems not to have penetrated either the
emanations or the penumbra of American jurisprudence as
represented by the Department of Justice or its nominee for
Chief Justice of the United States. Briefly, the fifth amend-
ment to the Constitution declares that "[n]o person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . ." Taney said that the Constitution recognized the
right of property in slaves by declaring in article IV as follows:
No person held to service or labor in one State, under the
laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of
any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such ser-
vice or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party
to whom such service or labor shall be due.25 '
This represented constitutional recognition of the laws of the
slave states that regarded those persons "held to service or
labor" (viz., slaves) as chattel property. Moreover, in article I,
section 9, the Constitution declared that "[t]he migration or
importation of such persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by the Con-
250. See generally CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED (1959).
251. COMMAGER, supra note 217, at 322.
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gress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight
",252
This unrepealable limitation for twenty years upon the
power of Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states . . ." was evidence, said Taney,
that a Negro slave was regarded, at the time the Constitution
was written, as "an ordinary article of merchandise and prop-
erty. '2 3 One might cavil that since no other form of property
is thus singled out in the text of the Constitution it would have
been more proper for Taney to have called it extraordinary.
Although one might object, as Lincoln did, that the right to
property in a slave is not expressly affirmed in the Constitu-
tion, one can hardly deny that it is affirmed by necessary
implication. If the government of the United States is com-
pelled by the Constitution to recognize the validity of those
state laws guaranteeing the right of property in a slave and is
expressly empowered to assist in the enforcement of those
laws, then one can certainly say that the right of property in
slaves in the laws of the aforesaid states is recognized by the
Constitution. But "no person [may] . . . be deprived" of prop-
erty "without due process of law."2 To deprive a citizen of a
slave state of his particular form of chattel property because he
set foot in a United States Territory with it would certainly
seem to qualify as a violation of the right to property protected
by the fifth amendment.
Justice Rehnquist, in a passage I already quoted, has
declared (on the authority of John Marshall) that when "the
popular branches of government . . . overstep the authority
given them by the Constitution ... or invade protected indi-
vidual rights," the Court may act to protect those rights.2 5
Now this is precisely what Taney believed the Court was doing
in the case of Dred Scott. Looked at in this light, a law exclud-
ing slavery from a Territory would be as surely unconstitu-
tional as an ex post facto law. Whatever one may say of
Taney's opinion, at this point, it cannot be censured as a usur-
pation of power by the judiciary.
What then was wrong with Taney's opinion in Dred Scott?
The heart of Taney's opinion was the judgment that constitu-
252. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.
253. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.
254. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
255. Living Constitution, supra note 193, at 696.
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tionally the Negro was not a man, but a chattel. Everything
that Taney had to say about the power of Congress over slav-
ery in the Territories followed from his opinion that the slave
was the chattel property of his owner and that the owner's
right in that property was protected by the fifth amendment.
How can Rehnquist object? According to Justice Rehnquist, all
moral judgments are merely "value judgments" and take on
"generalized moral rightness" only by being incorporated into
a constitution by a people. The constitutions of the slave states
in 1857 reflected their peoples' "value judgments" that
Negroes-whether free or slave-were "so far inferior that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."
For this reason they "might justly and lawfully be reduced to
slavery . . . ." These "value judgments" having been duly
incorporated into these state constitutions had, I may presume,
"take[n] on a form of moral goodness because they [had] been
enacted into positive law."2 Moral obligation proper, accord-
ing to Rehnquist, is grounded only in the positive law.
"[I]ndividual moral ['value'] judgments," he says, have refer-
ence only to the consciences of the individuals who hold
them.257 And, it would appear, all consciences are created
equal, which is to say that prior to enactment into positive law,
no one's moral judgment has any more authority than anyone
else's. All moral judgments are, according to Rehnquist, in a
Hobbesian state of nature with respect to each other.5 8 That is
to say, apart from positive law [viz., the will of the sovereign]
no action (as for example enslaving another human being) is
unjust. The opinion that the Negro is subhuman has, there-
fore, equal authority a priori with the opinion that he is
human, and whichever of these opinions gains "sufficiently
numerous" adherents will become the positive law and have
the authority of the sovereign people behind it. By this fact
alone can it be called morally obligatory. The truth is that Jus-
tice Rehnquist has no ground whatever to object to Taney's
opinion in Dred Scott. Indeed, Taney's opinion, as we have
restated it, is the only one consistent with Justice Rehnquist's
premises.
But Rehnquist's and Taney's premises are wrong. That
the Negro is a human being is a matter of fact and not of opin-




Appendix C: Original Intent
ion. In the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution, the slave
is referred to, not as a chattel, but as a person." 9 He is "a per-
son held to service or labor," but a person nonetheless. The
state laws holding him to such service or labor called him a
chattel, but the Constitution does not. Even the aforesaid state
laws were not themselves consistent in holding him a chattel.
The very essence of chatteldom is the absence of a rational
will. A chattel-e.g., a dog, a cow, or a pig--cannot be held
responsible for its actions. Only an adult human being, one
who has reached the age of consent, can be held responsible
for his actions, because he is responsible for knowing the dif-
ference between right and wrong. Yet Negro slaves, not to
mention free Negroes, were held responsible for a variety of
felonies under the criminal codes of all the slave states. As
such they were, however, inconsistently "persons" in the sense
of the fifth amendment. But what about free Negroes? Who
ever heard, Lincoln asked, of free horses or free cattle? And
what about the laws forbidding miscegenation? Who ever
heard about laws forbidding the marriage of whites and cattle?
Fundamental to the law of the Constitution was the fact of
the Negro's personality-in short, his humanity. But it cannot
be repeated too often that a person cannot be a chattel and a
chattel cannot be a person. Viewed in this light, one may say
that the Constitution is self-contradictory, if not schizophrenic.
But it is an axiom of constitutional interpretation that a self-
contradictory interpretation is a mistaken interpretation,
because one cannot obey a self-contradictory law. That the
Negro belongs to the species homo sapiens is as undeniable as
that any white (or yellow, red, or brown) individual belongs to
this species. His rationality-his use of the parts of speech
which characterize human language-is indicative of the
essence of his humanity, the color of his skin, a mere accident.
What makes the slaughter of cattle for food not only lawful,
but moral, is the subhumanity of their species. What makes the
gratuitous killing of a black man murder is the fact that his
species is the same as that of the man who murders him. But
what makes the killing of a black man murder, makes his
enslavement theft. For to enslave a man is to steal his labor
and the fruit of his labor. This is theft apart from all positive
law as much as murder is murder apart from all positive law.
Indeed, to take the whole of the fruit of a man's labor for his
259. COMMAGER, supra note 217, at 332.
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whole life makes murder and theft, in any final sense, morally
indistinguishable. Hence Lincoln denied that the moral con-
demnation of slavery required any positive law. The ground of
this condemnation was antecedent to any positive law or to any
human pronouncement whatever.
Slavery is founded in the selfishness of man's nature-oppo-
sition to it in his love of justice. These principles are an eter-
nal antagonism . . . . Repeal the Missouri Compromise,
repeal all compromises, repeal the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, repeal all past history, you still cannot repeal human
nature.26
0
Taney's opinion in Dred Scott was wrong for one paramount
reason. He did not see that the Constitution, grounded in the
principles of the Declaration of Independence, reflected any
standard of justice other than the positive law. He did not see
that the word "person" meant any human person whatever his
race, creed, or nation.
In December 1860 Lincoln wrote to his old friend Alexan-
der Stephens-who, he hoped, was still a friend and not an
enemy-that the South would be in no more danger from his
administration than from that of Washington. 26' He would no
more interfere with slavery in the slave states than had any
President before him.2 2 But that, he said, did not meet South-
ern objections: "You think slavery is right and ought to be
extended, while we think it is wrong and ought to be
restricted. That, I suppose, is the rub. '263
That was indeed the "rub" that led to secession and civil
war. It was also the "rub" in Dred Scott. Until Justice Rehn-
quist learns this lesson from Abraham Lincoln, he will not
understand the original intentions of those who framed the
Constitution of the United States.
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